Originally Posted by BOAC
I would raise your 'nicety' to a 'desirable'.
Yes I would agree with that. Re-reading the accident report (Manchester 737 Aug 87), a point of concern was that the fire burnt through the fuselage allowing smoke from the pooled-fuel external fire to contribute to the toxic conditions in the cabin. The wind was a factor in this and hence the AAIB recommendation for crews to have procedures.
4.1 Procedures should be developed to enable the crew to position an aircraft, when a ground fire emergency exists, with the fire downwind of the fuselage. Visual indicators of local wind direction located within the manoeuvre areas would be valuable aids to the implementation of such a procedure. (letter to CAA 14 March 1986)
4.2 Research should be undertaken into methods of providing the flight deck crew with an external view of the aircraft, enabling them to assess the nature and extent of external damage and fires.
4.3 Operators should amend their Operations Manuals, if necessary, to direct crews on any rejected take-off or emergency landing to stop on the runway and review the situation before a decision on clearing the runway is made.
4.4 Consideration should be given to the requirement to fit an evacuation alarm permitting flight deck crew to instruct cabin crew to initiate an evacuation immediately, or if the aircraft is still moving to prime for an evacuation immediately the aircraft is brought to a halt.
Note that 4.2 recognised that crews may not know what the external situation is; therefore I suggest that without a clear external view time should not be wasted in further assessment before evacuating. I think that a similar comment applies to 4.3, if you stop on the runway and you are not sure of the situation then get out – without considering turning as this only delays the evacuation.
I would be interested in the results if the AAIB were to reconsider the impact of their findings, and hence recommendations in the light of new cabin layout requirements which speed the evacuation and the use of fire/smoke retarding furnishings.
BOAC, I would not agree with your assumption that the last second or two makes no difference, the Manchester report suggests otherwise.
To answer the original question; if an operator’s procedures require a turn then it should place the fire downwind of the cabin.