Lots of repetition, even in the simulator, can be the first trap waiting to grab you. For example, an engine failure is expected and almost always happens at or just after V1. Why not skip the PRM approach training and (as briefed) set up an engine flame-out while dragging in the fog at Localizer minimums {about 400' agl} with gear down and flaps 40 at a very low energy state such as Vref+5?
For what it is worth, I've never been a superior pilot, nor flown a widebody jet. But partial automation on the B-757 could be a concern, with both pilots fairly new on the plane.
But does reliance on having at least two or three other experienced flightcrewmembers ('having a staff') also create a trap, even with some automation, or is automation the main focus when it is a novelty? If an aircraft can be safely flown with a basic autopilot and "heading select", especially when returning to a nearby airport, then why try to use all of the automation-especially when many crewmembers have little or no line exposure to it?
A 'classic' L-1011 with a highly-experienced crew crashed many years ago into the nighttime Florida Everglades due to the focus of all three pilots (one was FE) on a burned our lightbulb. Reportedly, nobody simply flew the plane. Did the active role as "handling pilot" seem too simple and was always assumed, at least back then? A bump against the control yoke somehow initiated a subtle, gradual descent over dark swamps-from only about 1500 or 2,000' !
The crash of the United DC-8 in Portland OR, due to overemphasis on a fairly minor problem, and no seriously stated, very clear warnings by the FE, or awareness by the Captain, led to an emergency fuel situation and a crash.
This might not pertain to the C-5 disaster, but the United crash inspired United Flight Ops to create the concepts of CRM.
The horrible nightmare at Tenerife was also excellent motivation for teaching Captains to listen to crewmembers' concerns. A television episode about the influence of human factors on the Tenerife tragedy tonight described a phenomenon whereby a pilot who instructs in a simulator and does limited line flying can have a different "mission-oriented" or "mission reset" thought process compared to those who only fly the real airplane. The Captain who was the flying pilot felt pressure to depart, and yielded to the temptation, being quite aware of rigid limitations on the crew duty period.
Did the C-5 Wing require at least one pilot to have about 100 hours (or 5 legs etc) in the glass cockp1t before being paired with a pilot who had no training on the FMC/MCP etc?
Most of these reviews of some accidents are for the benefit of the younger pilots who might not be aware of them. Most, if not all of those crewmembers were highly-experienced, often 16-20 years or more. And nowadays, the younger generation relies on the automation or other technology to save them from using (developing?) flying skills
. This mindset was apparent on the first/last cruise of the Titanic.