We were
lucky the Strikemaster had his transponder on. No transponder = no TCAS, AND no detection by the Centre using SSR only.
The Safety Action will place more workload on the Centre. All this for a specific VFR operation in G airspace, that has not flight planned, and who does not pay.
For
"intermittent radio operation, reception anomalies, shielding of some of the other pilots’ radio broadcasts"
read - had the radio volume down, and intercom up.
Under the 24 Nov. changes, directed calls to the Strikemaster shouldn't have been made by inbound B737. These probably "stepped on" the mandatory downwind, base, or final calls made by the C150.
The C150 people wouldn’t be happy with the Strikemaster lining up in front of them. The prospect of going round with a jet taking off underneath or landing with the runway occupied would be daunting for a training pilot.
The report doesn’t say how the Strikemaster cleared the threshold. By the time line, the B717 must have been close to blocking the holding point.
None of this was mentioned in the report, because it was not the essence of the incident. But it goes to show how the delicate balance of smooth ops can quickly go awry and lead to more serious matters.