FAA to conclude 2 engines as safe as 3 or 4

[Ignition Override]

Donstim, good points.

However, let's review just two of the exceptions to the FAA's "safety first" policy. After one or two ATR-42s (with European airlines) suffered serious aileron control anomolies in icing conditions, the FAA gave US airlines no instructions or guidance to help avoid this problem. And so an ATR-42 suffered "aileron snatch" over Roselawn, Indiana, and every body onboard died. The First Officer was the son of one of our Captains. Before this tragedy, the FAA had been informed about the incidents in Europe, but did nothing, according to former Am. Eagle pilots who I've worked with often. The FAA realized that their icing certification was quite flawed-this was verified during testing behind a USAF KC-135, which sprayed water in front of an ATR-42. After the smashed bodies in Roselawn were put into plastic bags, the FAA could no longer pretend that they knew nothing about a problem. This is just one more example of "safety first".

We all know about Valuejet's horrific tragedy and how an airline inspector's concerns were overridden by those with higher GS (Government Service) ratings. Over the decades, the NTSB made dozens of rulings on safety issues, each of which individually would have been at very moderate cost to airlines, without any FAA regulatory changes. After the Jetstream accident in North Carolina, Part 135 airlines were ordered to upgrade to 121 standards, but aside from that the majority of relatively minor changes were ignored by our friends at the FAA. The FAA stressed that safety came first-but only AFTER the loss of revenue passengers on the Valujet DC-9, and the consequent awkward revelation in front of Congress and the NBS News network etc. Even the ValueJet Vice President of Maint. claimed that the overall maint. responsibility had been outsourced to SabreTech etc. This entire operation was with the FAA's blessings.

The FAA did have (has?) the cost/benefit analyses to help those gentlemen decide how much safety, and at what costs to given airline fleets. Based upon how many decades passed before the FAA required a standby/reserve flightcrewmember to have an assigned rest period during each consecutive 24 hours, we all understand the FAA's priorities. Never mind the addition of a ferry (Part 91) flight(s) to a long duty period, which is still not addressed by Part 121 duty period, crew rest rules and limitations, unless I've missed some changes.

My next question for Ppruners in general about ETOPs is whether, based on enroute alternates being further than is now allowed, will the US airlines allow a Captain to seriosly delay or cancel a flight, due to worsening alternate forecast weather?
If this type of ETOPs were allowed by many foreign government regulatory agencies (all subject to national political factors?), due to competitive reasons, would all of them allow a Captain to make decisions based upon safety instead of cost?

There are Dispatchers with major US airlines who, after a Captain requires fuel for an alternate airport, will deceptively take fuel OUT of the normal contingency, i.e. 25-35 minutes, and, like the wizard in Monty Python's "Holy Grail", "create" alternate fuel-but now the contingency fuel is about 10 minutes. No doubt about it, this is pure deception and bending to commercial pressures (a dispatch supervisor...notice that I do not capitalize those words). Several hours later that day at the same hub airport, the weather was much worse, and the release from TPA had a reasonable dispatch fuel load. My safety report followed, based upon the early morning flight. The further departure delay is then a result of waiting for the fuel truck to show up.

So what would this be like with commercial (political?) pressure to fly a much larger ETOPS jet almost as if it were a three or four-engine plane, and pilots concerns might threaten a 'loss of face' and schedule chaos for a flag carrier?