I used the second link (no particular reason) and it worked fine with the standard right click and save target as.
What a terribly sad report, full of "what ifs". What if they had been 50 ft higher, or 200 m left of their track (like, over the road). Also, how close to the steep drop off to the coast they were: so near but so far.
I agree that an AVAD DH setting policy may have helped and of course EGPWS. However, what degree of fidelity would the EGPWS have to allow flight through the pass without warnings, even if clear of the ridge in question?
Despite the lack of DH setting, though, the pilot would have an indication of approaching ground as the altimeter tape on the PFD depicts the ground level as a brown base that would have been slowly rising to the datum point (also a similar brown base on the radalt display on the ND). I can only guess that in the conditions he would have been more occupied with looking out the window, rather than at his instruments, especially with AP holds engaged.
One or two comments (after a quick speed read) seem a bit crass:
"Survivable if seats and structure built to a higher spec?" I guess you could say that about all accidents!
"Attempted to shut the engines down" Really? You've just had an unexpected impact with terrain, at night in bad weather, which results in the blades disintegrating, and then in the subsequent 2.5 seconds as you tumble 100 ft down to the ground you calmly reach up and retard the fuel cut off lever, open the engine switch guard and turn the switch off, then pull the emergency electrical cut off ganbar! I doubt you could do all that while sitting on the ground, in daylight, having primed yourself to do it!! How about impact forces and objects (branches etc) penetrating the cockpit being the more likely answer?
I was also struck by the fact that theories were put forward as facts, such as "the pilot WAS subjected to confirmation bias". I'm sure NTSB/AAIB etc would have used expressions like "the pilot MAY have been ..."
Finally, it illustrates perfectly a statement that was in Flight International a year or so ago when they were reviewing the annual airline accidents for that year and discussing the fact that CFIT was still the major cause of accidents. It said that in almost all cases of CFIT, the CVR showed that the crew were experiencing a feeling of unease prior to impact. If in doubt, there is no doubt!
