Just to point out some facts... I removed the thread in question because, late on Friday, Ryanair threatened me with legal action because I had, in their opinion, allowed false, damaging and defamatory allegations concerning Ryanair's safety, safety record and operating standards to be published on this website.
Now, I and my mods try to keep a fair debate going and Ryanair tend to get more publicity on here than most other airlines when it comes to gripes. What they object to is allegations that their safety record and operating standards are anything but the highest and I am not in any position to dispute that.
I and my mods try to decide which allegations are serious and which are malicious. If any are obviously malicious then we take care to remove them as soon as we spot them. Others may not be so obvious and we sometimes don't notice them until they are pointed out to us by others who believe them to be, in their opinion, false and/or malicious. In this case, as I will point out below, the grim repa was out of order by making some of the claims in the original post. However, as I will point out below, there were some operations by certain pilots which appear on the face of it, carried out in breach of current regulations and safety standards.
In the letter I received Ryanair claim that their own investigations into the matter have revealed that none of the allegations are accurate or true. They also claim that further damage has been caused to Ryanair in that it appears that the allegations have now made their way into the national media. As far as they are concerned, Ryanair is an airline that operates to the highest safety standards and its good name has been tarnished by these, in their opinion, false allegations which were published here on PPRuNe.
Whilst PPRuNe does not and never has deliberately published false or defamatory allegations intentionally, we take as much care as we can to make sure that what is published is verified as far as is possible with our very limited resources. If anyone, and in this case Ryanair, does not believe that the allegations are true or that they are defamatory and request that they be removed, we remove them until such time as they can be verified. Unfortunately for us here at PPRuNe, Ryanair, who like to claim that they are bigger and better than BA appear to be much more sensitive to any criticism that impugns their safety standards. I have to respect that sensitivity and unless the bearers of such allegations are prepared to put their real identities to their claims they have no right to demand unlimited rights to free speech on here.
I do not work for and have never worked for Ryanair and as far as I am concerned, the only contact I ever have with them is as an occasional passenger. I do meet their pilots from time to time on my travels and I observe them when I am at work. I have no personal axe to grind with Ryanair and in fact they have been good customers of PPRuNe by taking out long term advertising. Ryanair have offered to settle their claim against me for what they regard as defamatory statements on the basis that I make a £5,000 contribution to an appropriate charity and that I immediately remove the thread.
They also want an undertaking that I will not publish any further false defamatory statements on the PPRuNe network relating to Ryanairs safety or operating standards and that I will provide Ryanair with financial compensation in the event that any such statements are published. They also reserve the right to bring legal proceedings against me for damages and to close down PPRuNe without further notice.
So, there will be no more allegations about Ryanair's safety or operating standards. Verifiable facts are allowed and an example of how they must be published, in this case with reference to the alleged operation of some Ryanair flights in breach of Low Visibility Operations, without exception, is provided here:
There are some publicly available facts. Some of which is teaching Granny to suck eggs, but hopefully doesn't leave any gaps.
Firstly, the recorded aerodrome Met visibilities are available from many sources, such as NOAA. As you may be aware, the IRVRs can be different, but the reported Met Vis at least gives a flavour of the conditions and points towards the possibility of potential breaches of the rules having taken place.
The recorded Vis values were as follows:
2120UTC - 1400M Fog
2150UTC - 0300M Fog
2220UTC - 0200M Fog
2250UTC - 0100M Fog
2320UTC - 0100M Fog
2350UTC - 0100M Fog
0020UTC - 0100M Fog
(Source: wunderground.com and NOAA)
PPRuNe contributors say the RVR was between 375M and 200M whilst some aircraft landed or made approaches.
Next, we know for sure that NOTAMs and other information were published regarding the serviceability of facilities at Stansted on the evening in question. The wind speed and direction during the evening was ~5Kts from the SSE, so it is probable that Runway 05 was in use.
Firstly from the UK AIP Supplement S03/2006
"
LONDON STANSTED - MAJOR RUNWAY WORKS
1 Introduction
1.1 Starting Monday 20 February until Thursday 30 November 2006 major Runway resurfacing will take place which will require the runway to be restricted or fully closed. The work will also include the provision of a new airfield lighting pit and duct system.
2 Timetable and phasing of works
2.1 The works is planned in three phases. One and three will result in a reduction of the runway distances and/or the availability of supplementary runway services and facilities. During the nightly working period in phase two the runway will be closed.
2.2 Works will require the Runway centreline and TDZ lights to be withdrawn during this period, a separate notice will be issued detailing this."
This was issued on the 17th January 2006, so operators should have been given a heads up from that to look out for the temporary loss of Runway centreline and TDZ lights. The validity of the works contained in the Supplement was Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday evenings from 2259UTC until 0500UTC.
Further, the Supplement also lays down a note regarding the suitability of the lighting during the outages, namely:
"
All lighting configurations during the nights working period in phases One and Three comply with the CAP168 criteria for non-precision approaches and take-off IRVR being in excess of 400 m."
If the alleged landing incidents took place during a Phase One period of working, then the lighting was suitable for a non precision approach.
NOTAMs filled in a bit more detail, and are long standing publications for this specific WIP.
For the approach lighting, there is a reduced service, but only between the stated times of 2315-0445UTC:
Q)EGTT/QLACG/IV/NBO/A/000/999/5153N00014E005
FROM 06/03/28 12:36 TO 06/06/29 04:45 A0731/06
E)RWY 05 OPR WITH LOW INTENSITY APCH LIGHTS, 210M IN LENGTH WITH ONE CROSSBAR. MON-WED 2315-0445
For the runway lighting, it is a reduced service from the 2nd of April until the 31st of October. There is no mention of greater availability during the day, before night work commences. It is a black and white reduction which was in force for several weeks before the allegations... and will continue for the main part of the rest of the year:
Q)EGTT/QMRLT/IV/NBO/A/000/999/5153N00014E005
FROM 06/04/02 05:00 TO 06/10/31 05:00 A0748/06
E)DUE RESURFACING, RWY CL AND TDZ LIGHTING NOT AVBL. RWY LEAD ON/OFF WHERE AFFECTED WILL BE REPLACED BY BLUE EDGE LIGHTS.
There is also an ILS NOTAM, but I think it is largely irrelevant as there is no corresponding NOTAM detailing what is available once works commence, the published NOTAM merely tells you what service comes back and when, so any reduction in ILS capability once WIP has commenced is inferred rather than stated. On that basis, I think it is safest to assume that full CAT III availability on the ILS system was in place for the times of the alleged incidents. It make little difference to the case anyway in my opinion, since other 'rules' override it as you need other components to allow such approaches.
Q)EGTT/QICXX/I/NBO/A/000/999/5153N00014E005
FROM 06/02/27 16:57 TO 06/07/30 23:59 A0376/06
E)ILS AVAILABILTY AFTER NIGHTLY RWY WORKS IS AS FOLLOWS.
CAT 1 ILS 0600-0730 MON-THU AND 0600-0900 SUN (CAT 3 IS AVBL IF FORECAST WEATHER CONDITIONS REQUIRES).
CAT 3 ILS AVBL AFTER 0730 MON-THU AND AFTER 0900 SUN.
(Source: UK AIS)
So we have an idea of the weather, we know the equipment availability on the airfield, and we will make the assumptions that the crews and the aircraft are all fully compliant with CAT III operations. However, under JAR-OPS 1.45, there is a referral to AMC/IEM C, specifically AMC-OPS 1.430(b)(4) 'Effect on Landing Minima of temporarily failed or downgraded Ground Equipment'. This specifically excludes CAT III operations at night where there are no centreline lights. CAT II operations can continue provided the RVR is 550M at night. So at best, with a fully serviceable ILS, CAT II approaches could be carried out.
(Source: JAA JAR-OPS)
There are just 3 further parts to consider. The ATC 'rules', any UK CAA 'differences', and the actual landing times of the aircraft alleged to have not complied.
Looking at ATC first, the relevant rule is that concerning 'Absolute Minima'. There are 2 main relevant points within this. Namely that it is only mandated for non precision approaches or when CAT II or III guidance cannot be provided by the ILS. If the assumption is that the ILS was still at CAT II or III guidance levels, then this rule is probably a red herring. Regardless, ATC have no power to restrict an approach, whatever the category. The second point is that all RVR values passed should be recorded when the RVR falls below 1500M – so at least the CAA/IAA should have something to go on !!!
9.4 Absolute Minima
9.4.1 Absolute Minima is a theoretical value, calculated according to the instrument approach and facilities available at the aerodrome, which will be equal to or less than the specified operating RVR for a Category A aircraft carrying out that instrument approach.
The purpose of this procedure is to act as a 'safety check' where a pilot may have made a gross error in calculating his Aerodrome Operating Minima for that approach.
9.4.2 ATS Providers shall make available to controllers the Absolute Minima RVR for each notified instrument approach procedure at their airfield. These values are based on the calculation process notified in the AD 1.1.2 section of the UK AIP. This data will then be displayed at relevant operational positions.
9.4.3 Controllers shall apply the procedure below to all civil flights whether operated by a UK or foreign operator. Military flights, including those operating as General Air Traffic (GAT) are excluded from this procedure.
9.4.4 The Absolute Minima procedure is to be applied when the ILS is not capable of providing Cat II or III guidance and when non-precision approaches are being flown.
9.4.5 Existing legislation applies to Public Transport and non Public Transport aircraft making instrument approaches to aerodromes. When the reported RVR or equivalent RVR, is less than a pilot's Aerodrome Operating Minima (calculated for the instrument approach being flown), a pilot may not continue the approach below 1,000 feet above the aerodrome level.
However, if the pilot is already below this level and the RVR then reduces below his Aerodrome Operating Minima, it is permissible to continue the approach to the relevant specified Minimum Descent Height or Decision Height. If, at that point, the required visual reference for landing cannot be established then a missed approach will be commenced in accordance with normal practice.
9.4.6 Should a pilot indicate that he intends to commence an approach when the reported RVR or, if not available, an equivalent RVR (obtained by factoring the reported met visibility) is less than the calculated Absolute Minima value, then the controller must inform the pilot immediately with the following phraseology:
'(Callsign) you are advised that the current RVR/visibility is (number) metres which is below the absolute minimum for a (name) approach to runway (number). What are your intentions?'
If the pilot states that he still intends to continue the approach below 1000 ft above aerodrome level the controller shall inform the pilot:
'(Callsign) if you continue the approach and descend below 1000 ft above aerodrome level, it is believed that you will be contravening UK legislation and I shall be required to report the facts, acknowledge.'
This shall be followed, at the appropriate moment, by:
'(Callsign) there is no known traffic to affect you making a (name) approach to runway (number)'.
And subsequently:
'(Callsign) runway visual range (number) metres, there is no known traffic to affect you landing, surface wind (number) degrees (number) knots'.
Controllers must ensure that pilots are told as early as practicable, when they indicate that they wish to make an approach, that the RVR or visibility is less than the calculated 'absolute minimum'.
9.4.7 When a pilot has stated that he wishes to commence or continue an approach, controllers shall continue to pass any changes in the weather throughout the aircraft's approach. If a controller is required to inform the pilot that the RVR is below the 'absolute minima' and if it is known or believed that the pilot descended below 1,000 feet above aerodrome elevation when the RVR was below the calculated Absolute Minima RVR for that approach, then a CA 1261 shall be submitted.
9.4.8 Controllers are reminded that Absolute Minima values are theoretical values which, when used, serve as a final safety check to remind pilots that they must comply with their mandatory Aerodrome Operating Minima. If a pilot asks for the Absolute Minima he shall be advised that ATC are unable to supply this information to pilots and that he should refer to his mandatory Aerodrome Operating Minima.
9.4.9 This procedure is not intended to permit a controller to prohibit a pilot from making an instrument approach other than for traffic reasons or when instructed by the Aerodrome Authority. Controllers are not responsible for ensuring that pilots observe their mandatory Aerodrome Operating Minima.
Controllers are reminded that the decision to commence an approach rests with the commander of the aircraft. Controllers should not question the right of a pilot to commence an approach or perform a landing, other than in the circumstances described above, nor enter into extensive dialogue on the RTF once the Absolute Minima phraseology has been passed.
9.4.10 If a pilot requests the relevant Obstacle Clearance Height, this should be provided to him, together with a warning that he must make the necessary calculations to obtain his required operating minima.
9.5 Aerodrome Operating Minima
9.5.1 Aerodrome Operating Minima in relation to the operation of an aircraft at an aerodrome means the cloud ceiling and runway visual range for take-off, and the decision height or minimum descent height, runway visual range and visual reference for landing, which are the minimum for the operation of that aircraft at that aerodrome.
9.5.2 Controllers are not responsible for determining, passing or enforcing a pilot's mandatory Aerodrome Operating Minima. Controllers shall follow the 'Absolute Minima' procedure when the reported RVR, (or equivalent meteorological visibility1 if RVR measurements are not available), is below the calculated absolute minimum value for the published instrument approach that the pilot intends to follow.
Note: Observations of visibility and RVR passed to aircraft making an approach to land when the visibility is less than 1500 m shall be recorded. Records shall be made available to the CAA on request.
(Source: UK CAA CAP 493 Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1 Section 3 Chapter 1)
Next up, the pilot rules and Absolute Minima laid down in the AIP. These are exactly the same as those specified in JAR-OPS 1.45:
UK AIP AD 1-1-2
2.10 Instrument Approaches.
Instrument approaches are divided into non-precision approaches and precision approaches:
a Non-precision approach
An instrument approach using non-visual aids for guidance in azimuth or elevation but which is not a precision approach;
b Precision approach
An instrument approach to landing using ILS, MLS or PAR for guidance in both azimuth and elevation;
Categories of precision operation
Category 1 operation
A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height not lower than 200 ft (60 m) and with a runway visual range not less than 550 m (500 m for helicopters).
Category 2 operation
A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height below 200 ft (60 m) but not lower than 100 ft (30 m) and a runway visual range of not less than 300 m.
Category 3 operations are sub-divided as follows:
i Category 3A – A precision instrument approach and landing with:
1 a decision height lower than 100 ft (30 m); and
2 a runway visual range not less than 200 m.
ii Category 3B – A precision instrument approach and landing with:
1 a decision height lower than 50 ft (15 m), or no decision height; and
2 a runway visual range lower than 200 m but not less than 75 m.
and then:
For CAT 1 Operations:
4.3 Precision approach
4.3.1 The lowest minima to be used by an operator or pilot for Category I operations are:
Table 5 - RVR for Cat I Approach
Note 1: Full facilities comprise runway markings, 720 m or more of HI/MI approach lights, runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights. Lights must be on.
Note 2: Intermediate facilities comprise runway markings, 420-719 m of HI/MI approach lights, runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights. Lights must be on.
Note 3: Basic facilities comprise runway markings, <420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of LI approach lights, runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights. Lights must be on.
Note 4: Nil approach light facilities comprise runway markings, runway edge lights, threshold lights, runway end lights or no lights at all.
Note 5: The above figures are either the reported RVR or meteorological visibility converted to RVR in accordance with Table 10 below.
Note 6: The Table is applicable to conventional approaches with a glide slope angle up to and including 4°.
Note 7: The DH mentioned in Table 5 refers to the initial calculation of DH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to take account of a rounding up to the nearest ten feet, which may be done for operational purposes, (eg conversion to DA).
4.3.2 Night operations. For night operations by aeroplanes at least runway edge, threshold and runway end lights must be on.
(Source: UK AIP AD)
As there are no TDZs or centreline lights (H24), then the facilities are deemed
Intermediate and the minimum RVR required would be
700M with a DH of 200'. This would increase to
800M when the RW05 approach lighting reduced to LI only after 2315UTC (becoming
Basic).
There are no tables in the AIP for CAT II or CAT III, however, the minimum (with FULL facilities) would be 300M and 200M (CAT IIIA) or 200M>75M (CATIIIB). However, as we have discovered, the AMC-OPS criteria are the relevant ones and are more restrictive due to the reduced lighting availability.
The final part of the jigsaw would be to establish who landed, and when… this we are still trying to find out. Regrettably, asking Stansted ATCO's direct would probably not be a wise move on the assumption that the regulators are probably already giving them grief !!
In summary then:
What conditions were in place? –
Night, with a steadily decreasing Met Vis of less than 1500M after 2120UTC.
Was there full lighting available at Stansted? –
No, this was subject to an AIC Supplement and a NOTAM (both issued well in advance of the subject time period).
What CAT of ILS was available for an approach? –
Due to the lighting outage, CAT III was not possible, the best that could have been in place was CAT II.
What RVR is required for CAT II at night with lighting as available at Stansted? –
550M Minimum
What was the measured RVR? –
Unknown precisely, but Met Vis was below 550M from the 2150 METAR onwards. ATC were required to record any RVR or IRVR values passed to pilots making approaches. Anecdotal evidence puts the RVR at between 375M and 200M whilst some aircraft landed or made approaches.
Did any Ryanair aircraft land after 2150UTC? –
To be determined.
Should Approach Bans or Absolute Minima procedures have been used? –
If CAT II ILS was available, then this is not applicable.
Is there a case to answer?
There is a fair bit of public domain information out there, as you can see. With just a little more information, it would be possible to construct a set of facts from which people could form their own conclusions. I shall rely upon the learned opinion of PPRuNe's lawyers about Ryanair's complaints and claim. Posts by 'Jackwhoknowsabitofeverything' types giving us their unlearned opinion are not helpful.
The assurance in the letter I received from the lawyers that Ryanair investigated the 'allegations' and found them untrue is open to debate. They are not the Regulator and they would not be given unhindered access to ATC recordings or IRVR databases. So, if their pilots told them everything was fine and above board that is obviously good enough for them. However, there remains the question of why did some Ryanair aircraft land at STN when, according to the evidence so far obtained, the RVR's were below the minimum laid down in the safety regulations? Could it just be a coincidence that each individual captain breached the same safety regulation? Whilst the "buck stops" with each captain, the questions raised about the corporate and management culture within Ryanair and its effects, if any, on an individuals responsibility is not open to debate.
Probably enough to go on with for now anyway but if anyone has a record of the actual landing times of any aircraft on the night in question, please feel free to forward them to me. Until such time as the IAA decide to let us know the results of their own investigation then, as far as I'm concerned, this discussion is off limits.
You have been warned.
Edited to add that none of the above could have been put together without the assistance of PPRuNe's dedicated, professional and highly intelligent moderators. They are from all aspects of aviation, not just pilots and without them PPRuNe would never have become what it is today. All I have done is collate it and present it for consideration.