John Purdey
I will explain thois only one more time and then heed An Teallach's advice.
The pressure not to fly the Mk2 happened long before the accident. The RAF, as was their right, and presumably because they were very short of SH assets, elected to take a CA Release with significant limitations. After the accident there would only have been strong pressure to ground the in-service aircraft if there had been a full technical investigation - as this did not happen as a deliberate decision of the Board (or higher authority?) there would not, I assume, be any further pressure from within the RAF to ground them (although I would bet that there was a lot of dicsuion on this within the Chinook community) - grounding would have called into question the original decision to bring them into service, would have left the RAF desperately short of SH assets, and, who knows, might have had few influential people questioning why the Mk2 was chosen against the detachment commanders advice and request (and remember this was the first Mk 2 in NI and the Mk 1 was available in NI until I think about 3 days beforehand) to fly a VIP non-operational mission with reduced margins of safety and all the known operating problems - some of which were clearly detailed in the RTS, and others which were also taking place on a regular basis. Boscombe Down had of course grounded the aircraft and had asked MOD to make their concerns known to the RAF.
Hopefully you have got it this time and you should now be able to answer your own question on what RAF senior management might feel they had to lose.