Blacksheep,
EASA justification for changing the method for release after line maintenance is set out in TOR 145.12. Their reasons relate to several near accidents; one example cited by Eric Sivel (EASA) at the ALAE AGM was that of an aircraft that attempted take-off with one of its mainwheels partially installed. This was apparently attributed to a failure by the engineer to record the defect in the tech log- it was not a PIREP - prior to accomplishing the mainwheel replacement.
I fail to see how changing the method of release would prevent incidents such as this. The thrust of human factors training - certainly in my courses - is that we can only reduce incidents and accidents through application of HF and other principles; the fact that we are involved in every facet of aviation except the weather makes the eradication of human error impossible.
EASA's suggestions amount to throwing out the baby with the bath water; the example cited would best be mitigated by RCA resulting - dare I say it - in a bit of HF training (perhaps!).