John Purdey
I can only assume that your post 2121 was written with tongue firmly in cheek after your earier comments about going round the bouy.
I find your position quite amazing, but both Tandemrotor and Tucumseh's posts cover my views as well - you do not KNOW the cause of this accident any more than we do. Even if your theory were to be correct, and I am not denying that has to be a possibility, then this would be a navigation error accident not Gross Negligence. I have made this point to you several times, but you have never responded to it.
This campaign is about clearing the pilots names not the "mission impossible" aim of saying what caused the accident. The reason many of us are concentrating on airworthiness and engineering issues is because these were badly (in the case of the Senior Reviewing Officers totally) neglected by the Board. I have given you several examples where short-term and potentially flight critical problems could have occurred - read post 2031 for Shy Toruqe's view as a helicopter pilot concerning engine run-aways and control restrictions - read Sqn Ldr Morgan's evidence to the Board concerning flight critical short-term defects - read Stn Cdr Odiham's comments (before the bit that looks like it had to be re-written) concerning possible crew distraction - even read Mr Cable's AAIB report where he accepted that the bracket that had detached a few days earlier causing a control restriction and which was found detached in the wreckage might have been detached pre-impact. You may not have the AAIB report so to help you here is the relevant paragraph:
It was noted that during ZD576’s service since MLU the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached from the thrust/yaw control pallet (Ref 27) as a result of the release of two threaded attachment inserts bonded into the pallet. Each of the two control pallets comprised a 7.5x24 inch, 1.1 inch thick, aluminium honeycomb panel with a 0.02 inch thick aluminium skin bonded to each face and contained respectively 23 and 26 threaded inserts for component attachment. Each insert was bonded into a blind hole bored through the outer skin and part way into the honeycomb, to approximately half the thickness; its integrity appeared to rely on adhesion between the exterior of the insert and the damaged honeycomb around the hole, together with some keying effect between the adhesive and the rim of the skin hole by virtue of the boring producing a marginally larger diameter hole in the honeycomb than in the skin. Inspection of the pallet remains after the accident showed that both inserts for the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached, together with most of the similar inserts on both pallets. This was unsurprising in view of the attachment method and, as an insert could apparently pull out of the pallet without appreciable distress to the components necessarily resulting, the possibility that insert(s) had detached prior to the accident could not be dismissed. Few signs were apparent of extensive strong bonding of the adhesive to some inserts or to the panel.
I have tried to explain why the aircraft were not grounded despite the Boscombe Down advice, but you do not seem to want to listen - why don't you write to the MOD under the FOIA and ask for the relevant correspondence - then you can see that we are not misleading you. You could also ask them for all the FADEC Incident Reports and MWOs at the same time if you see these as being relevant - I am sure that you will find MOD to be most helpful.
JB