Reply to John Purdey
From the way you write it sounds like you are in a better position than me to answer the question as to why the fleet was not grounded – plenty of the experts certainly wanted it to be. In their report TM 2210 Chinook Mk2 Interim Release Recommendations A&AEE were UNABLE to recommend CA Release for the Chinook Mk2. However, after clear pressure from the RAF (A&AEE Letter ADD/308/04 dated 6 June 1994 describes the background) which I assume was based on operational imperatives a CA Release at Issue 1 with many flight restrictions to "overcome" the “unquantifiable risks associated with the unverifiable nature of the FADEC software”, was provided in November 1993 – this was updated by AL1 in Mar 1994 and was the standard against which ZD 576 would have been operating in June.
On 25 May 1994 A&AEE held a meeting at which in-service engine related defects, of which there had been at least 15, were discussed. Of the 15 incidents discussed 4 were considered to have “particularly serious implications” – these included one on ZD 576 on 19 May during which engine over-temp damage occurred in the air and on the ground, but the fault could not be identified. In their letter to MOD of 6 June A&AEE stated that they “now considered the consequences of the risks and the probability of their occurrence to be unacceptable” – it was on this basis that they grounded the flight trials aircraft. In the same letter to MOD A&AEE “strongly recommend that MOD makes their (Boscombe’s) concerns known to the RAF in order that they (the RAF) may consider their own position”. From the other end of the scale we know that Jon Tapper also worried about the use of a Chinook Mk 2 tried to keep a Mk1 in NI for this task.
At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham, in answer to a question as to how much the unforeseen malfunctions occurring in the Chinook Mk 2 since its introduction were a matter of discussion among helicopter pilots, answered,
"They occupied our minds to a great degree, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well" (Q 852).
Hardly a ringing endorsement for what was going on.
I would like more information on where you see the accusation of a cover-up. Certainly I assume that the RAF made its decision to continue flying the Mk 2 as a result of the operational imperative, and one could argue that as there were no more accidents (but plenty of incidents) they made a good decision – but this does not mean that the choice of the Mk 2 and ZD 576 in particular for such a non-operational but VIP sortie was a good one – nor does it mean that the pilots must have been to blame for the accident. I do not think that there was a “conspiracy” involved in bringing the Chinook Mk 2 into service, but given MOD’s behaviour since then in the face of almost total, informed, opposition to the verdict one has to start wondering what is going on – again perhaps you know. I suppose that in many ways the MOD position on ZD 576 merely reflects MOD’s usual approach to having its judgement questioned – Deepcut, Porton Down, Gulf War Syndrome, Body Armour, Tactical Radios, etc all spring to mind. Certainly as an organisation MOD does not always seem to have grasped the old adage that when you are in a hole you should stop digging!
You go on to say:
“Even without technical evidence in the form of CVR or whatever, this explanation [navigation error?] fits all the facts, and leaves all talk of mysterious and rapidly vanishing technical failures, attempts by the IRA or whoever to lure the aircraft to its destruction, major distraction of the two pilots (remembering the golden rule 'keep flying the aircraft') or whatever, floundering in its wake.”
I do not know why you raise the “golden rule” issue of keeping the aircraft flying – there is every indication from the Board evidence that the pilots were doing this until the very end. I am surprised, and disappointed, that you equate the potential engineering aspects of this accident with “little green men” and IRA bomb attempts – the potential airworthiness and engineering issues are certainly not floundering in the wake of yours and Campbell’s navigation error theory – a theory which if true would anyway be an error of judgment and not a gross negligence verdict – remember what this campaign is about – it is not to find out the cause of the accident that is impossible – even Campbell, despite his claims, has not done that – it is to clear an unjust and criminal slur on the pilot’s names. You imply that I do not understand the airmanship issues – if you knew my background you would realise that I probably recognise these issues at least as well as you do despite what I assume is a much smaller number of flying hours. You happily ignore the airworthiness and engineering issue many of which far from being “mysterious and vanishing” are well documented facts, even in the CA Release and Board evidence, in favour of operational hypotheses, but worst of all you seem to be happy to support leaving the slur against two pilots names against the clear rules which should have stopped the Reviewing Officers making such a decision regardless of any inputs on the airworthiness and engineering problems.
JB