Whooper 5
You said you were involved in the planning of this trip and I asked you what was your recollection of their intentions in the vicinity of the Mull – the answer to which could be very enlightening to us all. If you were to confirm their close in turn at low level then they could only be “blamed” for an error of judgment at worst and then the bit from John Blakeley’s recent post would be very relevant:
(regarding the Tornado crash)
<<the Board concluded that Flt Lt XXXXX"s actions constituted an ERROR OF JUDGEMENT and therefore the Board recommends that he be absolved from blame.>>
That is, if they misjudged their distance off to begin their turn, it was just an error – not breaking any regs or being reckless in this common approach to the Mull.
I believe that it is a far better strategy to establish that they were intending to turn thus and use the comparison in judgment on the Tornado case to argue for their names to be cleared rather than trying to keep EVERYTHING unknown and relying upon there being insufficient proof beyond all possible doubt , etc. From what I have heard about historical BOIs, it is most probable that the latter strategy is futile – and certainly gags debate.
John Blakeley
Re your post 2064
<< …would it not be quite reasonable for MALM Forbes in the middle seat to have selected the next waypoint as the safe heading to fly?>>
I thought that only the pilots were up front at the critical time.
Also, your comment
<< …If we accept the TANS data as correct is 0.81NM, even with a GS of around 150kts (an assumption still based on TANS data – not a fact), an unusually close (or even dangerously close) distance to turn 7 degrees left in VFR conditions?>>
From my own observation in identical conditions and from what the lighthouse keeper (who was standing next to me at the time) told me, this was a common practice.
I believe that others on this thread CAN confirm this.
Despite what you have written on the distance of waypoint change from the Mull, I doubt that you can stretch it out enough to significantly enlarge the window of opportunity for mechanical/ control/ technical problems – as I have said before, they were already very close in at waypoint change and should have started turning by then if they had had confidence (which they did not) in the position given to them by the SuperTANS – further, if they had had a good visual reference by which they could have estimated their distance (ie they knew how far out they actually were) they should have started their turn at about the point of waypoint change.
What I am saying is that something delayed their decision to turn rather than something prevented it.
John Purdey
As I have put to you before, if you plot the course on a map/ chart, the argument about the fog station is rubbish because of the oblique approach – it would be more accurate to describe it as closer rather than to the right. As Brian Dixon asks (2098), what are you basing the line of approach on?