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Thread: SMR, CAT III...
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Old 9th Apr 2006, 15:05
  #22 (permalink)  
Spitoon
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Oh my, I'd nearly forgotten this one...

Sorry, it's been busy lately and I'd forgotten about this rather interesting debate.

I repeat again, if I am a CAT I equipped aircraft, I do not have the capability of making an automatic approach and landing.
Sadly this is a rather simplistic approach, if you'll excuse the expression. If you are the only aircraft about then this would be OK but if there are others, and particularly the de-luxe versions which are equipped for Cat II/III approaches, the others will no doubt want to make the approach to a lower minimum and are entitled to expect that the runway and ILS signal etc. are protected. And that's why protection measures are put in place when the cloud is lower than 200ft. Of course, if the runway/ILS is only able to support Cat 1 then your argument applies.

You may have worked with technical pilots on the topic over the years but this is a system and pilots, like controllers, are only likely to be fully aware of their part of the system. I have worked with technical/management pilots too, and whilst I respect their extensive knowledge of how to operate aircraft, they often exhibit serious misunderstandings of other parts of the system!

Fascinating that you feel that the expression 'primary causal factor' should have died in 1990. Presumably this is because Prof Jim published his cheesy thoughts then. Why do all other approaches need to be ignored because a new theory that you happen to like better - although, admittedly, from a system perspective it is a nicely presented approach that most people can understand? Primary causal factors can be represented by any one of the slices of cheese and plugging the hole serves the same ultimate purpose. Yes, if you go deeper into the model, as you allude to in your post, you can give different names to failure events but if you've got a hole in a slice of cheese you want to plug it - the way you do that is not important in the short-term (subject to being confident that you are not altering other parts of the system). How you analyse other failure events will always be subject to fashions and personal preference - one day someone will publish an analysis methodology and it will be better than Jim Reason's, in some people's minds anyhow.

I, too, am still rather busy so I'll leave it at that for the moment. I await any thoughts in reply - especially on protecting the ILS in low cloud conditions, with interest.