Cazatou
Why keep avoiding the basic questions – the answers to which could improve everyone’s understanding of the conditions, what systems were available, etc, etc?
Do you think that the a/c’s speed was normal for the purposes of the flight with regard to its all up weight etc or not? – simple for someone on this thread to answer, one would have thought. Forget the whole “conspiracy theory” for a moment, the answer to this simple question could show how wrong it was to insinuate that they had been flying too fast as had cropped up throughout the inquiries and would surely contribute to the argument that the verdict was ill founded.
Regarding the system that I have suggested may have been involved, you wrote:
One thing you should learn about aircrew is that they, generally, do not refer to items of aircraft equipment by their official numbers. Aircrew will refer to the UHF/VHF/DME/ADF/VOR/ TACAN/ILS/GNS/Inertial Nav etc.
Please check out post No. 62 of 19th March 2006 on “Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety” thread, specifically the bit:
"In mid 2004 I noticed that the we were not quite following the rules set in SPINS regarding the PRC112s and associated equipment".
Whatever you call it, my point is no one else here has discussed the system – if anyone reading this thread recognizes it, it would be very nice for us all to know what is the “correct” name for it and then perhaps others with experience of it will hopefully recognize it, wake up and join in the discussion.
Regarding your cheap shot:
<<11 years ago he reported his concerns to "the authorities" and they do not appear to have got back to him. I wonder why that is?>>
I put a lot of effort in back then at the expense of my family, friends, and work – I put my concerns over this crash as a higher priority – I was deeply concerned that this aspect had been overlooked and wanted it addressing. With support from the political side, a meeting was arranged with the RAF at Whitehall; it was meant to be a technical discussion but the person I had to deal with was an Air Commodore who seemed to be there as a brick wall.
And this:
<< I must confess, however, that the most stunning confession of your naivety was your statement that you informed the relevant authorities 11 1/2 years ago of your concerns that sabotage may have played a part in the Chinook accident.
I am sure that such a thing had never even crossed the minds
of the relevant authorties in the UK!!!!>>
I meant specifically by way of navigation systems and I pre-empted the inquiries so as to give the authorities the opportunity to look for evidence in case they had overlooked the possibility – here’s what I posted to you verbatim:
<<The first thing I did 11+ years ago was to raise my concern on the possibility of sabotage by way of navigation aids with the authorities - the haste (before inquiries complete, etc) was to allow them the chance of gathering evidence before it was lost.>>
I believe an apology is in order, thank you.
Regarding the comment about naivety – who is it here that cannot contemplate the possibility of this team being removed for being an obstacle to the peace process?
I have said it before and I will say it again: you do not have to accept the whole scenario that I have put forward but by following the navigation aspect in detail many parameters of this flight have been cleared up that, in many cases, had otherwise been used to criticize the pilots; to list a few:
The actual local weather conditions (common in that area with that prevailing wind at that time of year - good for VFR at low level – mist localized on landmass, clear at sea right up to shoreline);
That they were not breaking VFR for a helo in those conditions before they entered the mist (which was right on the landmass and not before);
The appropriateness of the speed;
That they were never planning to go over the Mull and so had not engaged an “inappropriate rate of climb” – further, the “cruise” climb was so far short of clearing the Mull that it was obvious that this was not the intention from this perspective alone;
The accuracy of the SuperTANS after a water crossing (this crew had such reservations about its accuracy that they would not have been alarmed if, say, it had disagreed with another reference by ½ a mile or so at waypoint change);
The approach angle to the coast (being so oblique that a mistaken visible feature near the shoreline could have had little influence on their route);
Etc.
Further, I would have thought it in the interests of other aircrew that as much as possible be determined about this crash in the interests of safety in the future - which is why I do not understand your personal attacks when it would have been simpler and more beneficial to have helped clear these details up earlier – much earlier.