chornedsnorkack,
... the safety margins ... are not necessarily assured .. in case of any other failure condition
Depends on the A/L pertaining to the certification .. but that, together with variation in environmental conditions (esp runway surface), is the crux of the worries one should have ...
.. there is no "safe side" of V1 ... the certification assumption is that rejecting at any speed after V1 is unsafe ...
I suggest this misses the underlying point and principal real world risk concern.
The V1 concept (similar to much of the handling and performance aspects of certification) puts one of a set of lines in the sand. If the certification boundary conditions are replicated, then it is valid to presume a reasonable correlation between the certification data and the real world .. if not, then such a presumption will be tenuous to an extent reflecting the divergence.
If the particular runway condition is similar to the certification presumptions AND is distance limited for ASDR, then an accel-stop with a speed excursion likely will be fraught with an unpleasant lack of success .. the consequences are related to the particular environment only and have naught to do with the certification. If, on the other hand, the TODA/TORA is comfortably not limiting (ie not BFL limited), continuing with a delta below V1 (presuming Vmcg is not limiting) likely may be quite successful. In a similar manner, one can argue the complementary situation with limiting TODA/TORA, but non-limiting ASDR.
However, procedurally (ie from an SOP point of view), using the above argument is quite unacceptable as a general principle.
.. should then one make the assumption that ... warnings in critical flight phase should be assumed to be false warnings? That sounds a dangerous assumption.
Couldn't agree more. Two factors at work here ..
(a) procedurally, unless there is reliable evidence to indicate that a warning is false, it should (must ?) be considered valid
(b) historical reality is that many warnings are false and this needs to be considered in the captain's decision making process where there is time to reflect on multiple courses of action.