Hi Punkalouver.
I was trying verify that figure as well. I have been off the last several days, so have not been around the Jepps to check this out. The only place I am accustomed to seeing distance remaining beyond glideslope is on the Jeppesen 10-9 pages along with the runway specifics. Now I see that Jondc9 has verified that as the source of his stated figure. (Easy, big Jon, I think Punkalouver just wanted to know the source of that info! Thanks for the verification.)
I do think that if they touched down some 400' beyond the rwy/ G/S intercept point, it is indicative of a minimal flare, sufficient only to reduce the impact with the runway to a moderate 5.0 on the Richter scale! Flying it into the ground with no flair might (at the ROD required to stay on glideslope at their groundspeed) likely have exceeded the certified structural limts of the airplane. (part 25 calls for 10 fps (600 fpm) at max ldg wt) And going below the G/S in minimum visibility conditions doesn't have much of a future in it either. So it seems entirely possible under the above assumptions that:
1) The approach was begun with the belief that it could be completed according to regulation and policy. I would also, giving this crew the benefit of any doubt, tend to think that they believed it could be safely accomplished. (albeit with no margin for error or failure)
2) The approach was flown accurately enough to put it down about where the most ideal profile that could be planned under the prevailing visibility conditions and allowing for a minimal sink rate reduction prior to touchdown would put it. Just for reference, 400' goes by in about two seconds at touchdown speed. Not much float there!
3) Had the reversers deployed when first commanded, a successful stop on the runway would likely have been completed. It is important to learn why they did not.
I'm not trying to say that any of this is proven fact. Indeed it it not yet that. Need more data (such as a CVR transcript and FDR traces) for that. But I do want to challenge this idea that this was a long landing or that they floated way down the runway just because there was 2000' of runway surface behind them at touchdown. Based upon what is apparent so far, this idea should at least be viewed with suspicion if it is not discarded alltogether.
Finally, This idea of allowing landings to be planned down to a gnat's behind, with no built-in safety margin, taking credit for the effect of reversers, to an icy runway in minimal IMC conditions, is at the least, deserving of a thorough audit. It must be determined if this procedure provides the desired level of safety margin appropriate for public transport aircraft service. Even if there is no intent to do so on the part of SWA or the FAA, allowing the procedure used to determine the required runway for this landing could have placed a subtle kind of pressure to "make it happen" on that crew. Most pilots are honest working folks who want to get it done if they can. Rules and company safety culture set the limits. Consideration must be given to the possibility that eliminating the "reverse credit" in the future may reduce the chances for a repeat occurance. In it's letter to crews regarding this issue, the SWAPA safety committee gave some very carefully worded, yet useful suggestions on dealing with the issue. Especially if you read between the lines a little. PICs are being called upon to earn their Captain's pay by using their command judgement to make the tough calls. The letter suggests some ways to justify it.
Best regards,
Westhawk