Helios Ray,
You are obviously no veteran of the 100-page Cypriot thread, but the point you're making is both original and serious.
Nevertheless, I don't see why you seem to imply that the available data are no less implausible than the 'answers' given to explain them.
You obviously take into account the new evidence which the investigation has unveiled relatively recently - when the previous thread had abruptly fallen silent
The new facts (confirmed during the re-enactment briefing) are
(1) Cabin Alt Horn sounded at 12,000ft, about 4 minutes from takeoff (09:11) - NOT at 15,000ft as previously assumed.
(2) At 29,000ft, about 15 minutes from takeoff (09:20), the crew was still in communication with the ground - ATC and Helios maintenance chief.
(3) The cabin altitude at the end of the plane's 2.28-hour flight at cruise alt FL340, was around 26,000 feet.
The above new data are broadly consistent with the timeline put forward by Captain Tsolakis in his first full interview with Flight International on Aug.24:
http://www.flightinternational.com/A...no+fuel++.html
In this interview the Greek Chief Investigator also reveals something extraordinary about the plane's airworthiness:
[quote]Tsolakis says he is worried at what he is finding in the engineering records of the aircraft, which had required air conditioning system rectification five times in less than two months, leading Helios engineers to question the aircraft's fitness to fly.[/qote] The importance of that observation will become apparent later.
This is then followed by the central tenet of the sudden death scenario:
It was only 4min 50s into the flight before the crew reported to ATC an air conditioning malfunction, Tsolakis reveals, but they kept climbing. Passing through 14,000ft, the cabin altitude warning alert activated and it was not cancelled.
Four months later, we know that the sequence of these early events was the reverse of what Tsolakis had implied: The cabin altitude sounded at 12,000ft, ie BEFORE the crew notified ATC of their airconditioning problem. And then, the cabin altitude horn WAS cancelled as they manually restored the OFV to the closed (or at least partially closed) position.
Here is what Tsolakis tells TA NEA daily in a full-page interview two months after his FI interview, on October 29:
When the plane took off from Larnaca airport, "the environmental control system packs and bleed switches were configured correctly. But the pressure mode selector switch was in MANUAL and pressurization of the aircraft was not automatically controlled, resulting in an increasing cabin altitude as the airplane climbed," Tsolakis tells the mass-circulation daily.
And then, here comes his salvo: "It appears that the captain and the first officer knew that [PMSS set in MANUAL]. As the plane was climbing at a rate of 4,000 feet per minute, the cabin altitude warning horn sounded in the flight deck and was cancelled by the crew, who believed that they had regained control of the pressurisation inside the aircraft, by manipulating the outflow valve manually. They then continued to climb."
In other words: No mixup of horns, no PMSS 'unwittingly' set in Manual, full open pressure valve shut manually by the crew, pressurization restored (temporarily), plane continues to climb while dealing with secondary problems (E&E bay cooling) with Helios engineers. This is all stated succinctly in another respectable aviation website:
http://www.b737.org.uk/accident_reports.htm
The aircraft departed Larnaca at [09.07 Greek time] for Athens. The crew reported to Cypriot ATC that they had a problem with the air conditioning system and wanted to remain at 16,000ft. At [09:22] the crew said that they had solved the problem and requested a climb to 34,000ft. Radio contact was lost with the aircraft at approximately [09:37], as it was entering Greek airspace, 30 minutes after its departure, although it did sqwark 7700.
Did they really hold their climb at 16,000 feet, when they started talking with Helios Maitrol? Was the 'problem' solved at 30,000 feet, when they requested a climb to 34,000 feet? Probably not.
Given Tsolakis' aforementioned evaluation of the plane's lackluster pressurization record and airworthiness, it is easy to understand how the �problem� re-emerged in full force after they decided to revert back to AUTO. From a (manually) closed position, the OFV gradually or swiftly opened again by one-third, and remained in the same position until it was found at the crash site, with the FDR registering cabin alt 26,000 feet at FL340.
It had happened before at the same cruise altitude (16 December 2004). It happened again on August 14. But this time - even though they were prepared for it - they couldn�t bring the plane down.
They just couldn't climb down an inch from 34,000 feet - not even glide down! For how long did they try to do so? How did Prodromou finally manage it by disengaging the autopilot?
Nobody will ever know for sure. But Tsolakis is right when he speaks to London's Guardian newspaper on December 15, shortly before his controversial re-enactment of the fateful flight:
It was a tragedy waiting to happen," said Mr Tsolakis. Ultimately, he said, every area of the aviation industry, from the manufacturers of the plane, to the airline, the mechanics, civil aviation ground staff, and pilots were to blame for the crash.