MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax
Flight International 18 Oct '05 has an article blaming inadequate training and fatigue for the crash. The interim findings of the TSB Canada, focusses on the introduction of the Boeing Lap-top and long duty hours as the likely principal factors of the accident. Both have been refuted by an MK Airlines spokesman (as Mandy Rice-Davies said so memorably many years ago "well he would say that wouldn't he?").
This accident came hot on the heels of an SIA 747-400 which also started its' take-off run with power settings and take-off safety speeds set for a TOW more than 100 tonnes below actual weight. In both cases, neither crew realised the significance of the lower than expected performance figures, nor did they call for or set maximum power when it was realised that all was not well. Both resulted in tailscrapes, sadly for the MK crew there was insufficient runway left to achieve lift-off.
We are all aware of approach and landing accidents and the recent efforts to highlight the need for stable approaches and touchdowns commensurate with the prevailing conditions; also there has been much comment on taxiway and runway incursions, with the need to be extra vigilant.
But what about highlighting the need for cross-checking the departure phase? How many of us know the approximate power settings and speeds for a heavy take-off and for a light take-off? In the case of the two 747 accidents, both errors resulted in a V2 discrepancy of about 30 knots.
Perhaps the legacy of the loss of the seven MK crew might be to re-emphasise the need to make our own last-minute cross-check of the runway in use, its' conditions, the flap set for take-off and the power/speeds as expected for the weight. Experience on type certainly helps, as can a clip-board or card memo with relevant figures as a guide. Safety is enhanced by learning from our own mistakes as well as those of others.