LEM. Interesting reply and thanks. I cannot understand why Boeing persist with the policy of the same pilot reading and responding to his own words. To me it is a recipe for potential disaster. I understand from a colleague who flies LH seat A320 that all Airbus challenges (normal and non-normal) are answered by the other pilot thus ensuring the integrity of the challenge and response.
CaptainSandl. As you say, the revised Boeing after take off checklist should prevent inadvertent incorrect switch selection (if used as Boeing intended). The absence of an effective central flight safety data base on incidents such as pressurisation boo-boos means that pilots only hear a fraction of what stuff-ups go on.
Because there are bound to be inadvertent mis-selections such as those I described, as well as the Helios Airways accident, in my view simulator instructors should include training on the subject. Too often simulator sessions are pre-programmed "canned" exercises entirely predictable and accent on ticking the regulatory squares rather than having a good look at the lessons learned from accidents.
For example how often have you seen in the simulator a specific exercise aimed at training for GPWS pull-ups from say a descent with speed brakes out at 250-300 knots? Not too often, I'll bet.