CTG,
Interestingly (I think so anyway), a lot of folk believe that the main reason that the RAF was able to upgrade the Jag so effectively was because we "owned" the rights to the aircraft, having taken them back from BAe as the ac grew too old for the company to maintain an interest.
The truth is more to do with a willingness of the then Jag IPT and its leader (a Gp Capt Engineer) to "assume the risk" of a lot of the specifics of the upgrade, particularly to GR1B standard. By applying common sense, it was quite simple to guage the relative risks vs merit of different parts of the upgrade;weighing in the balance the information from "a competent authority" as to the worthiness of equipment and software. The clever bit was in deciding whether or not your chosen "authority" was competent. An example would be the modification to the ejection seat to cater for the auto-removal of the goggs upon pulling the seat handle. Martin Baker were adamant that the mod could not be done safely for less than a prohibitive amount of cash. QinetiQ (DERA) had a mechanism, proven well beyond the stated requirements that MB had failed to achieve, which even the RAF could afford. But it would never have been installed if the IPT hadn't been willing to take DERAs testing as sufficiently "authoritative", over the "establishment authority of choice"
The point I'm rather cack-handedly making is that the RAF could in fact do exactly the same for a lot of other upgrades/programmes, because, and this is the clincher, we own the aircraft. Unfortunately, no one high up in the food chain (said Gp Capt for example was unceremoniousy dumped from his next job after promotion for putting civil service noses out of joint) is willing to put their name to any kind of "risk" - so we end up throwing, illogically but career enhancingly, good money after bad in an impossible search for certainty.
Now, it so happens that JackoNicko, who knows the people concerned very well, may be able to provide better examples, and more eloquently express all our frustrations that none of the lessons of the Jag upgrade have been embedded into our procurement culture or our relationship with BWOS.