Had a look at that
Cabin Pressurization and Control Systems (CPCS) Operational Description on the
www.eaawatch.net site, seems each valve has a seperate controller, on earlier airbuses the one active controler would operate both valves.
From the scematics for the system, the valves are in different locations, some in front of the aircraft, others in the rear, they receive different inputs, eg the forward ones receive inputs from ADIRU 2, and the rear ADIRU 1.
The outflow valve control module (OCM) schematics it clearly shows "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" processing modules. So it does have a manual over capability.
My reading of the OCM schematics does show three processors, one for automatic, one for safety, and one for emergency.
Had another look at the article "Mangan alleges that flaws in a microprocessor could cause the valves that maintain cabin pressure on the A380 to accidentally open during flight, allowing air to leak out so rapidly that everyone aboard could lose consciousness within seconds."
He does however fail to mention the "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" that each valve has on the schematics on that web site.
"Airbus has acknowledged that its designers faced challenges as they attempted to reduce the A380's weight. Early on, the company elected to go with four outflow valves on the A380, with only one motor on each valve, which is slightly larger than a cabin window. Each motor uses a TTTech controller chip, and there is no manual override system."
Having looked at the schematics, the majority of the paragraph is correct, however the "Each motor uses a TTTech controller chip, and there is no manual override system" is somewhat misleading, the automatic controller which is the TTTech one is separate from the "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" processors.
So it is true that the TTTech chip does not have a manual override, however manual over ride done using two other processors "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position". Whilst it is true that the TTTech processor (i.e. the automatic mode) does not do the manual override, for redundancy it is provided by other processors.
What the article does not state is the valve assembly has no independent manual override, just the TTTech chip has no manual override. The schematics show that the valve assembly does have "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position" capability.
The article also states "Most passenger jets have two cabin-pressure valves, with separate motors operating each. Because aircraft makers want redundancy on safety systems, the planes have three motors for each valve, with different chips controlling each motor. The Boeing 777, for example, has cabin-pressure chips made by Motorola Inc., Intel Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Most jetliners also have a manual override so that the pilot can take control in an emergency. "
and "Airbus says that the A380 has achieved redundancy by installing the extra cabin-pressure valves, which provide a safety cushion in case a valve fails. As for Mangan's allegations, they are "an unsubstantiated crusade," Airbus spokesman Clay McConnell said."
So what they are basically saying is this ...
Airbus has on the 380 four valves, in different areas of the aircraft, each vale with its own motor, each valve with Automatic, "Safety Override Position" and "Emergency Pressurization Position".
Boeing with the 777 has two valves, with three motors and three processors.
Having 4 independent valves in different locations is a like having 4 engines, and one valve like one engine. Whilst we know you are statistically more likely to have an engine failure on a quad turbine than a single engine turbine, doesn’t matter how you dress up the single engine turbine, one it fails your in trouble, and on a quad you continue on with your other three.