Exactly right HeloTeacher. Too bad Unctuous isn't able to make the obvious connection. He's too busy trying to make the accident fit his fantasy theories that have been proven wrong by the test pilots and investigators. The ability to recognize what is obvious to a helicopter pilot is what is needed, not a new design.
As I mentioned in another post regarding the Arizona accident, the PIC's experience was nearly 3800hrs total time but not much in a helicopter (35.7 in TH-56, 20hrs in CH-46 and CH-53, and only 97.2 in tiltrotors). The copilot had more helicopter experience (although even less tiltrotor time than the PIC) but he was apparently retrieving something from the floor that had distracted him (accidents are almost always a chain of events). Indications are that neither pilot recognized the symptoms of settling with power. It appears that their applying full power was an attempt to arrest the rate of descent. Using experienced helicopter pilots with a tiltrotor is the only thing that would make sense from a safety standpoint (the MV-22 is replacing the Marine CH-46s and CH-53s).
But not only is that not always the case, the problem gets worse when you add to that the fact that General Blot added the 'Blottle!' For those that are not familiar with it, that is the nickname given to the ‘power lever’ in a V-22. Originally it worked just like a helicopter collective – you pull it up and you increase the power and collective pitch, push it down and you reduce power and collective pitch. General Blot took a flight in the V-22 when he was in charge of the initial Osprey program. Having come from a Harrier background, he said, “get rid of that, I want a Throttle type configuration” similar to the Harrier. The result was that the guys that would be most qualified to fly tiltrotors (helicopter pilots coming into the program from CH-46s and Ch-53s) had to contend with required responses opposite to what had been ingrained through their experience.
This can be directly attributable to the first crash of a V-22 in 1991. The a/c had 2 of 3 fly-by-wire systems miswired in the lateral cyclic so that moving the stick left rolled the a/c right and vice-versa. On the very first test hover of the aircraft, the pilot, Grady Wilson, entered an unstable condition after entering the hover and didn’t know what the problem was. He got the a/c down onto the ground before serious problems occurred, but when he experienced a hard bounce and started to go airborne again, he reverted to old helicopter habits (as many of us would) and ‘pushed down on the collective.’ This of course meant pushing forward on the “Blottle” and resulted in an increase in power that launched the a/c into the air. That’s where the lateral cyclic control reversal took effect, the a/c rolled over and was destroyed. Incredibly nobody was seriously hurt. Thank goodness common sense prevailed with the 609 and they went with a more sensible collective style movement.