AirRabbit,
Thank you for your well considered reply. I can see by the questions you still have that you have given this matter quite a bit of study and thought. My apologies for misunderstanding your intended meaning in your earlier comments.
Those FDR traces would sure be easier to interpret if I could line them all up in parallel on a very large screen! At least one important step remaining to be completed is the analysis section of the final report. But alas, we will probably have to wait another year for the final report. Based upon my reading of past major investigation reports, I think that is the most likely place to see your questions addressed if indeed they ever are. I feel fairly confident that the events leading to the stall are pretty clearly described by the FDR and CVR data, making it possible to reach a few conclusions and find some lessons learned in the flight up to this point. These lessons related to general airmanship and aeronautical knowledge have been discussed in several posts. No need to repeat them.
As an aside, I would like to share my personal observations on the performance of the autopilot when coupled to the F/D while it is selected to IAS or mach hold. (to include FLC in Honeywell integrated EFIS systems.) In the Collins and Honeywell equipped aircraft I have flown, when these speed hold modes are used, there is a distinct tendancy for the aircraft to "pitch hunt". To avoid having to tolerate this condition of constant pitch changes, I and most pilots I have flown with prefer to climb these aircraft in VS mode since it results in a more consistent pitch attitude. It is a little bit more work to closely monitor the speed and occasionally adjust the desired vertical rate to stay on speed schedule, but it's worth it. Once you are in the habit, it works very smoothly. I do not know if this tendancy is common in the CRJ as I have not flown one. Maybe a CRJ pilot could comment.
It is the events following the first indication of aerodynamic stall that I find require further analysis for me to understand what took place from this point on and how this knowledge might be applied to benefit other pilots facing similar circumstances. It is clear that once the descent began, they were under a lot of pressure to find their "A" game and right soon! From this point in the sequence, the events should be analyzed without regard to how they got into this mess, since the next crew to face this situation could find themselves there as the result of a completely different cause like turbulence, etc.... GE data provided to the board indicate that in all documented tests, "core-lock" was overcome by torque from the starter when used. I hope this is proved to be the case.
Time to hang it up for now. Gotta fly in the morning.
Best regards,
Westhawk