"Thanks" those with experience who have responded.
M.85....
I agree with everything in your post regarding the quality of ATC as I've experienced it in those regions you mentioned.
Jumbo....
Well written post and I agree that ATC shouldn't assume levels of experience or language understanding, and factor in possible fatigue or experience levels of the crew. You of course did the right thing when telling Tower "unable" in your situation. I hope nobody here thinks they can't.
Readbacks do become a luxury sometimes due to traffic saturation, but keep in mind that reading back assignments in those high-density situations don't necessarily ensure or enhance safety. There have been "hearback" incidents where a pilot has misunderstood instructions, read-back the misinterpretation, and missed by the controller (Btw, the onus is still on the pilot if they read back incorrectly and it's not caught by the controller). During high-saturation, it's easier for the controller to see your compliance on radar (he's definitely focused) while stacking or turning other aircraft so his/her picture comes together. When a controller begins to "break...issue..."break"..issue", that's a sign that he's seeing more than what he's hearing, and readbacks are only enhance safety if they have the time to actually listen to them and catch a mistake.
This rapid-fire situation is only acceptable (but works) if both pilots in the cockpit are maintaining a focused listening watch for their callsign, and use cockpit prodedures that confirm between the two pilots they've heard the same thing while attending to their other dutes. The high-level of safety is maintained more in this way...crew coordination and internal confirmation.. than by a readback where unless we specifically request it, subsequent silence from a controller is understood to be confirmation. While he expects to see you complying on his radar, he also expects a query if a crew is unsure of the instructions.
Admittedly, you're in a less-than-favorable situation if your F/O isn't up to speed or has trouble with the language. I can remember early in my career flying Barons and King Airs single-pilot in that bad-weather Notheast environment, and I've never experienced higher workload levels since, anywhere...and that's understanding the language. At your stage, you shouldn't be having to fly "virtual" single-pilot now in that high-saturation environment and babysit.
Happily, we have TCAS nowadays, where what they do is backed up by an electronic source of our own to see. I certainly remember the days without, IMC, and the rapid-fire instructions were nonstop. That was literally "blind trust", but I don't remember them ever mating any two aircraft over a city. Also, you're old saying is one of the best around.
Cytherea.....
The only person I recommended to bid away from flying to the U.S. was IDunno, and that was not because of his inexperience, but rather his repeated, declarative, self-proclaimed opinion that his life was in danger every time he did, and that it was a "crazy" situation. He claimed ATC asked him to do impossible things with his aircraft....I seriously doubt that....ATC at the locations he flies into is well-versed in differing types of aircraft and their capablilties. I asked for facts and statistics to back up his statements...but he has never offered anything but emotional oubursts. For that reason, I recommended he just stay away, obviously being too-stressed, bordering on paranoia.
I agree, learning and adapting to work within a system only comes through actually doing it. Nobody is born with the inherent experience, and there is always first times for everyone whether they have 500 hours or 15,000. New is new, and even the most experienced have moments of confusion. Keep in mind that this happens to controllers as well. Like it or not, flights from the UK will be assumed to be piloted by highly-proffesional crews who don't get ruffled, speak the language, don't need a lot of coddling, and know the U.S. system fairly well.
The earlier referred-to NY ATC-Concorde exchange posted highlights this expectation, where the probable assumption of the controller was that the BA Concorde pilot knew he was getting a straight-in approach while others were flying the entire arrival. A favor, that worked well with the controllers need to avoid fuel-state situations, noise considerations, etc. The dressing-down he gave the pilot was basically sending him back to school because he realized that pilot made an assumption of his own..that the controller was stupid and acting arbitrarily. The controller didn't want to assume the lowest common denominator for the Concorde, but as it turns out, he had to in that case after it was on the ground. Having to treat everyone as the "lowest common denominator" is efficency-lost, so they don't.
That's a major difference in the two systems, and an outgrowth from the amount of traffic that's handled and environment.
Is that holding UK crews to a higher standard?.....well, yes, but that's no different from holding American crews to a higher standard of being able to speak English with no colliloquisms while operating overseas. The usual complaint is about "standared" R/T phraseology infractions....not actually mis-handling aircraft, violations, or missed assignments that create a danger. It sounds sloppy to the ear in the UK, and will simply confuse controllers into silence in other regions.
Danny.....
A great post and points well-taken. If mentioning certain things that seem unnecessary or achaic in others systems was taken as "Painting it with a broad-brushstroke", I apologize. That was not my intent, for I was doing so merely to highlight that small differences do NOT indict an entire system if it's working to a statistical, proveable, high-level of safety and efficency. The UK/Euro system is safe to a high-level, but has different ways of achieving it, and in my opinion this has evolved as a result of traffic volume and routine weather considerations.
I responded to the thread was because of blatant scaremongering by a member who extrapolated this BOS incident into an ad hoc attack while foisting himself off as an authority. In our profession, declarative statements such as his will be challenged when the issue is safety. If this forum were "hangar-talking" among peers, that would be ok. But it's a public forum for anyone to read, and so questioning his premise in public in order to highlight the lack of support for his "dangerous-trying to kill me" claim seemed reasonable. "Put up, or shut up", as the saying goes. If I had indeed responded to his attack in kind, I would "put up" the evidence making the same claim. There IS a difference between defending against an attack and making making one. The incidents I referred to happening to me under the UK/Euro system were not in the vein of attack.
They were cited to point out the obvious (and what I thought everybody understood); that any highly-complex system can never be designed to be "failsafe" in every circumstance. The inability to do so is in part what helps define something as a "highly complex system" in the first place. Any system is subject to human factors/errors. Lapses occur, but just as in operating national power supply-grid systems or running an aircraft carrier to it's full capability, the ATC system(s) are highly complex, but efficient to the point that the exceptions prove the rule. The BOS incident is one such example, and it's oxymoronic to use this exception as "evidence" that it's the norm. If it were, incidents like this wouldn't make the newpapers, and the internal and external investigative gears already set in motion seeking answers and resolutions wouldn't even exist.
That's all, I'm done with this thread as well.