been there done that
The crew here are obviously responsible for the outcome of this unhappy incident, so an element of blame can be fairly laid at their decision to climb to FL410, but their company should have been aware that it was a bit risky. If they were not aware, then they should have been made aware by Bombardier.
I worked for a regional carrier equipped with the CRJ200 and the CRJ700 and the most disappointing aspect of the 200 was that we were promised an aircraft capable of FL410, carrying 50 pax and of flying at M.85!!
It soon became apparent that although it was capable of all three performance targets, it could only do them individually! ie. a full pax load meant FL330 was the max attainable and also left you at max landing weight with only Company minimum fuel at destination.
Since all our pilots were already B737 or BAC1-11 type rated, we mainly just fell over laughing or got annoyed with the Bombardier Company trainers who really rated the CRJ and tried to get us to push the envelope.
In fact, pushing the envelope one day, in order to climb above FL390 to avoid CB activity, and checking with the ICAS2000 FMCthat we could make the altitude!, I got the CONT IGNITION caption and a bit of airframe buffet which led to a curt exchange with Reims ATC which gave me a lower FL after threatening them with a MAYDAY.
What worried me was even after initiating a descent and applying MCT, the bloody aircraft would not accelerate and remained at about M0.686 for nearly 300' until we stabilised level at FL370.
What had caght me out was that the SAT at the commencement of our climb was ISA -2 but by the time we had reached FL390 the SAT had increased to ISA +10 just as you'd expect passing an active weather front, and subsequent review of the performance chart revealed we had climbed about 300' above the CRJ200's service ceiling at our given weight!!
Well didn't I feel stupid.
But not as stupid as my management, who despite reading my ASR and giving me a tea and biscuits, felt that it was a one off.
Could I also add that the QRH for double engine failure does not help the crew make the transition from the windmill relight to the APU assisted relight and it was very common to see crews trying to achieve the rquired N2 during relight below FL130 without realising that they needed to push the start button first!
Although, as 411A points out quite correctly, a lack of experience is an important factor, a lack of training is the major causal criteria and if the Bombardier pilots who trained me are anything to go by, then a lack of experience in their department may also be to blame since they themselves had a mainly ex turboprop (C130 and Beech King Air) or had at best flown heavy jets in the RHS.
So having had the stick shake at FL390 on the CRJ and been ignored when I mentioned it what do you bloody well expect!