There was a great deal of research effort that was initiated at the time of the G-TIGK accident with several threads:[list=1][*]Was there a weakness in the structure of the tail rotor of the AS332.[*]Was the certification basis for lightning protection appropriate.[*]Did the certification basis take into account the fact that there were a predominance of positive strikes (or strokes) in the North Sea (and other areas like the Sea of Japan and North West States of the US).[*]Could a method of expeditious forecasting be provided that could enable pilots to avoid such strikes.[*]Was there any (on board) equipment that would allow a pilot to avoid local areas where the potential for strikes was present.[*]In the absence of any solution based upon the above, could operational procedures be improved.[/list=1] Roughly at the same time (circa 1999) there was a symposium at the RAeS on lightning (the proceeding can be obtained from the Society or from any attendee - there were several from the North Sea operators).
From memory, the results were as follows:
There was a change in the maintenance procedures for the 332 and EC offered a modified tail rotor assembly. Although there was a case for amending the certification basis for lightning protection, it was not considered that there was sufficient justification to cater for positive strike protection. (One of the conclusions that resulted from the RAeS symposium was that it would be difficult to establish the appropriate level of protection as the limit of the natural event would be difficult to establish.)
The Met Office were asked to conduct a survey of the conditions present at all of the known strikes to see if there were any common conditions - although there were no conclusive results, it appeared that the predominance of strikes occurred at or around the zero degree isotherm. The met office also produced a mathematical model which divided the North Sea into a series of zones which were coloured to indicate a potential for strikes (based upon the data drawn from previous events); this map was put onto the Met Office web site and made available on a trial basis. This caused a problem as, due to the fact that the potential occurred in air masses, large areas could be set to red for days on end and it was not clear what the operators/pilots were expected to do. (The lady who was referred to was probably from the Met Office on this research project.)
There was also an attempt to produce a methodology that could use the Met Office tools for predicting strikes - based upon real time data (and short term predictive models) - this would have been similar to that used to predict strikes around power stations or other vulnerable locations (France have such a system). Another system (produced by ONERA) required the provision of a number of special masts (measuring specific atmospheric disturbances) located on or around the coast - or offshore. Although this could have been done it would have been experimental with unknown results.
Both of the above systems would have required an end-to-end solution with specific on-board communication systems and involvement of ATC; this was not considered to be a practical proposition.
Concurrent with this, there was a research project to produce an on-board sensor. (This floundered mainly because Bond were sold and the main facilitator of the research - Tony Cox - left the industry to sail round the world.) Although sensors were designed and produced, the build up that they observed took place over seconds, was not directional and would not have provided the pilot with options.
A challenging area!
Jim