Mars,
I am not down on the METAR and I think it is highly relevant, indeed I think I included weather in my initial list of factors that need more investigation. See previous page.
I do need help trying to consider what the FAA rules are re NVFR, so please forgive lapses in the logic chain below if I have missunderstood the rules.
Let me use the weather that is being suggested to illustrate the point I am making. Dark, snowy, low viz. My question is, does this constitute NVFR in the USA? Isn't that answer a yes IF and ONLY IF I have a visible horizon (not considering NVG here) and sufficient ground or celestial light to enable nav by reference to the ground?
So if the pilot thought he had a visible horizon (no NVG) and in his opinion, sufficient ground or celestial lighting, he was good to go, yes?
If he flies NVG and he is non Instrument Rated, isnt the NVFR what his minimums are?
So technically, IF he FELT he had a visible horizon, and he had sufficient viz with ground and celestial lighting, then he was legal. Right so far?
It appears that if this was the case, then the NVG are irrelevant to the accident. Why would the outcome be any different unaided? He needed NVFR to go and he must have judged that he had that, therefore he could have gone without the NVG. As the flight progressed, the viz drops off and we get into trouble, so wouldn't that have happened regardless of NVG?
If you are suggesting that the NVG gave him confidence to launch into less than NVFR conditions when he otherwise would not have (considering he was not instrument rated) then is that the "fault" of the NVG or does the issue really lie in risk management, rule adherence, supervision, training, go/no go protocols, and most especially, in instrument scan profficiency, etc?
With all that in mind, I am merely suggesting that the ENORMOUS safety benefits of NVG should NOT be tarnished by some attempt to attribute blame to NVG for this particular accident.
WTBF: I think you are right!
SASless: Agreed.