Twenty five years on,Erebus remains the most perplexing of all commercial aviation accidents.Pilot error,airline dishonnesty and malaise or negligence on the part of the CAA for allowing the flights to continue without the requirement for a previous visit and no whiteout familiarization(USAF had whiteout briefings).Which one was it?Or was it all three combined?
As a professional pilot,if you were briefed on a route a week before a flight,would you then check that the coordinates of the flight plan handed to you on the day of the flight corresponded to the flightplan coordinates that you were briefed on a week earlier?
If you take into account the proximity of Erebus to the route,there are those who say that Collins should have checked.
Fate also played a part.Hewitt,the navigation specialist,would have alerted the crew if he had truly believed he was changing the destination coordinates by 27 miles,knowing the effect it would have had on the approach to the Sound.But he thought he was only changing it by 2 miles so he might be excused for not telling anyone.What are the odds of something like that happening?
Chippendale's report was unfair to the crew as they clearly recognized that conditions were "not actually that good" and decided to climb out but were too late.Did Mahon's report go too far in an effort to redress the balance though?Fly a DC-10 clean at 1500 feet and you'd better know damn well where you are.Using RNAV to fly a valley approach and dip under the weather is also problematical.Only ground-based navigation permits descent below MSA.
As to the CVR,Chippendale's interpretation caused a storm because it reported Collins as ignoring the F/E's mounting alarm.Was it "Bert" or "Bird",as in Cape Bird?CVR analysis is an art and open to interpretation.Very often the greatest tool is not technical enhancement but a listener who knew the crews and their speech patterns well.
Last edited by Rananim; 12th Dec 2004 at 09:39.