Brian Dixon
Many thanks. I had read your previous posting and was rendered speechless, but have now found my tongue. I’m not a pilot so cannot, and never have, commented on aircrew issues, nor do I wish to speculate. With respect to your posting;
Introduction
….. I am looking very much at the engineering area
….. failed to analyse all potentially relevant causes of the accident, including such basics as the airworthiness of the Chinook fleet at the time.
>>>>>I agree these are areas where factual information exists, as opposed to innuendo and fanciful notions. The point I try to make is that CA Release / MAR is granted for a mark of aircraft; but based on the evaluation, usually by Boscombe Down, of one tail number which has been meticulously prepared and presented in the best possible condition. The MAR relates to a very specific build standard, which may read something like “Y List plus mods x, y, z”, and the aircraft is deemed safe at that build standard. More often than not, this immediately follows Contractor trials, Service trials, or Joint / Contractor trials which may have assessed a different build standard; the difference often being Service Engineered Mods, as the default position of the Aircraft DA is that he is permitted to ignore / remove / gag and bag SEMs for trials purposes, especially when he has not been tasked to appraise them and incorporate a superseding mod.
Another issue here is that during contractor trials the design is Under Contractor Control, whereas during MAR trails it is often Under Ministry Control. The transfer of control is a formal process, demanding positive answers to a rigorous checklist before completion. This is the point at which red flags appear if, for example, engineering documentation is incomplete (see Bertie’s comments). Liability is therefore quite clear, with a named individual wholly responsible.
Underpinning both set of trials is a safety case prepared by the Aircraft DA. It can be seen that the safety case prepared for Contractor trials is not necessarily valid for the MAR assessment. The signatory of the MAR therefore relies on a raft of Service and Civilian staff using complementary processes to ensure that, as far as possible, the build standard is maintained across the fleet; a reliance which immediately muddies the notion of accountability. The process by which this is controlled is Post Design Services. PDS costs the same whether you have 1 aircraft or 100. It is not volume related. But, it suffers the same, and often more, cuts every time there is a fleet reduction or savings measure. The upshot, and I generalise here but speak from long experience, is that configuration control suffers and is lost through the MoD taking the risk not to fully assess SEMs. And, it is not unusual to have literally hundreds of updates/changes/mods missing entirely from documentation for one black box system, never mind a whole aircraft (the thrust of Bertie’s comment). I believe this places in question the safety of the aircraft. Nor can they afford to update the whole aircraft safety case as often as they would like, so a SC may actually be years old, supplemented by lots of annotations for each subsequent mod, but often omitting SEMs. I’m sure we all know of examples whereby an SEM is deemed serviceable, but is unsafe or has an adverse effect on other systems; and vice versa. (I’ve always thought this a contradiction – if it’s unsafe it must be U/S, but was corrected when I saw two Westland SEM appraisals which said (1) It works, but it’s unsafe, and (2) It’s safe but it doesn’t work – and approval to fit and fly both was granted. I was given a career brief on my brief career for challenging the decisions, but later made it my business to replace both designs when I assumed responsibility for their safety). This is largely as a result of gradual creep in the scope of SEMs. Nowadays, whole systems are embodied without consulting the DAs. Quite simply, this happens (a) because PDS funding is negligible, and (b) with the passage of time since it was properly funded, you can count on one hand those in the MoD who know how to do it properly. This is all factual, and the thrust of numerous inquisitions by Defence Committees and Auditors over the years. In particular, the NAOs “Modifying Defence Equipment”. In reply to it, CDP reassured the Defence Select Committee that configuration control would be regained on a particular aircraft type, only for the hard earned funds to be spent on something else. I doubt if he went back to admit he had (inadvertently) misled Parliament and the Committees don’t bother with follow-ups.
4. Reporting of Defects
Campbell rightly picks up the problem of Tapper's failure to raise a defect report….
....As anyone who has been on an operational detachment or even a major training exercise knows this approach to the reporting of what are perceived as minor or nuisance defects is often taken, particularly when there is a shortage of aircraft. It is not correct, but it is a fact of life that it happens.
>>>> I’ve posted before on the (legal) difference between Defect and Fault. I know what people mean when the wrong word is used so sorry if I sound pedantic but if you ask the MoD “How many defects does System X have?” they will invariably answer, truthfully, “None” (or very few). But if you use “Faults” the answer will (should) be “Many, but we can’t be sure as the investigative and recording systems have largely fallen into disuse through lack of funds”. They will answer the exam question, so accuracy is important.
I’m not too familiar with RAF procedures at Squadron level, but I’m not sure Flt Lt Tapper would have routinely sat down and filled in a MF760. Would that not be his JENGO? Either way, to criticise is disingenuous or unfair as anyone can raise a MF760. Contractors are specifically, and uniquely, delegated financial authority by the MoD to initiate investigations without MoD approval. The ONLY time a contractor can commit MoD monies without approval. There is a limit to each investigation in terms of cost, but not to the number that can be initiated. In practice, and I’ve seen it done many times (Nimrod guys are particularly adept), a JENGO or whoever’s in charge of a workshop shift at the time, can phone the contractor, have a bloody moan (sorry, politely report a fault), and the Contractor will initiate an investigation in the certain knowledge he will be paid. The Def Stan is very specific (for example, 05-125/2 for all air/ground/sea electronics). If it’s not called up in the contract (which exists for your benefit, to maintain the build standard and safety of your aircraft and equipment), ask why not.
My unique view of the world which I hope complements the fine work and offerings of far more experienced people.