I do not like your assumptions about what happened in the cockpit during the takeoff. You may well have access to more information than most of us but your rantings demonstrate a lack of understanding and a clear anti MK bias. Now I am not defending MK in any way but am interested in promoting the facts as they are known and suppressing speculation such as yours.
You place a lot of importance on the fact that the thrust was reset to the correct setting and that therefore "somebody must have known" the correct setting. The fact is that if you knew anything about 747s you would know that the max thrust EPR (in this case the correct EPR) can be displayed next to the EPR guages at the touch of a button by the FE.
Another thing you seem to be missing is that if the take-off thrust had been calculated incorrectly then so would the speeds. Therefore Vr as far as the crew were concerned would have been considerably lower than the actual Vr. Pulling the nose up "well below flying speed" was probably not an act of "panic" but simply a normal rotation at what the crew thought was Vr. The increase in thrust was more than likely a conscious decision by the captain to abandon the reduced thrust procedure due to a feeling of uneasines, not "panic".
I believe that the first time this crew knew just how much trouble they were in was when it would not fly at the original rotation.
All this discussion about events during the takeoff roll is diverting attention from the main error made in the calculation of the take-off data. When you place the aircraft at the holding point with the wrong data set you are relying on the last line of defense to save the day and that is never good safety wise.
