Rongotai
"some abstract and idealised propositions such as:
The captain has the ultimate responsibility and is in command"...
Whilst I'd be happy to agree that the other propositions are abstract, the role of the captain is enshrined in legislation, and can therefore be treated a little differently. I know from experience, when refusing to take an aircraft into what I considered to be dangerous weather conditions, that I had to seriously consider the consequences of that decision on the future eating habits of my family. I knew I had the right to say no, and I also knew I'd almost certainly win the ensuing disciplinary hearing - or, if it came to it, the Unfair Dismissal Tribunal. However, I also knew that ultimately the airline management would win the war, no matter how many battles I might win.
This brings to light the frequent duplicitousness of airline managements. In the (UK) airline alluded to above, we had been told during our conversion courses that we had the "clear and unambiguous right to say "no" if we felt the situation warranted" - pause - "-but don't you bl**dy well try it!"
To me, this is the nub of the problem. The innate behaviour of most airline managements is to agree that regulation is a good thing, that an open reporting system with no penalties is necessary, and that learning is the key - and then do everything in their power to subvert those processes. Pilots understandably then stop using the processes.
So, yes, you are correct about safety-commercial trade-offs, but I am not sure how that problem can ever be fixed. Airlines will think commercially, (most) pilots will think safety - mainly because they will probably be the first to die if a miscalculation is made.
I personally believe that any commercial trade-offs required in the pilots' decision-making process will untimately degrade safety. I also believe that in many cases, the pilot is the only one in a position to make critical safety decisions - which is why pilots are trained as they are, and why we don't have monkeys flying the aircraft.
On the flip side, you do have pilots who can be excessively cautious, or have another motivation for refusing a flight, and this can be enough to alter the fine authority balance between pilots and management.
Anyway, it seems to me you are now dealing with the very basic core of human nature. As we have seen with a variety of professional bodies over the years, self-regulation rarely works 100% of the time, and adherence to a rigid safety culture by an airline management is equally dubious - not because there is necessarily an intent to stray from the rules - but because humans are fallible.
I'm not sure all the preceding is very well written, but I don't have time to do it again - so my apologies if the thinking appears a little twisted.
One last thing - the day that I lose the authority to make safety decisions in the flight deck - in other words, if I were to become aware that I was not "TRULY totally in charge of whether the flight goes or stays in all circumstances" - will be the day I jack it in and do something else.
Once in my career, I let myself get talked into going off to Bergen in Norway on a particularly crappy day. It was early, and no reports were available from Bergen - but the forecast was horrible. We were in a 50 seat turboprop, and by the time we got to our PNR (Point of No Return), we were still unable to get the weather reports from Norway. I had only been in the company a few months, and had been told by a senior manager that if I wanted to stay employed, I had better bl**dy well get on with it.
So I found myself over the North Sea in the middle of winter, the sun had yet to rise, and we were in moderate icing. By the time we got within VHF range of Norway, we discovered that our destination and all three of our alternates were technically unusable due to excessive crosswinds. Well, we couldn't go back, so we just had to choose the best one and have a go. We chose Bergen, made the approach in a gusting 60 kt crosswind. We had a 50 degree crab angle on down the approach. I really had no idea whether I would ever see my family again. My F/O - also new to the company and the aircraft - was white with fear and totally unable to function. The turbulence was severe and the cloud very low.
Anyway, to cut a long story short, I got in onto the ground, managed to stop it leaving the runway, and eventually slid to a halt right on the edge. It was all done completely on instinct. I hate to think what my heart rate was, but it has never been as high before or since. We were very, very lucky.
After that, I vowed never again to let myself be influenced by management when it comes to any safety-related decision. You can only have one person in charge in the cockpit.
That's what I reckon; open to discussion...