MOR
"in fact, my view is that disciplining the crew is innapropriate except in cases of deliberate misconduct. Even then, the heavy-handed application of discipline will never solve the underlying problem".
Agreed - provided that you also accept that there may be systemic causes or contributing factors to human error commited by an individual. But on the face of it your point here seems to be at odds with what seemed to be a linear dependence on the command structure and SOP's.
" In any case, the more normal thing in most airlines I have had dealings with, would be a period of re-training in the sim, and it would be re-training, not a punishment (I know, I used to carry such re-training out)."
The trouble here is that I too often see this:
(a) being regarded as the only intervention necessary (which locates the 'problem' exclusively with the individual); or
(b) being believed as having been remedied by re-training when the error was in fact a one off situationally triggered mistake that is unlikely to re-occur, and which anyway has already led to agonised self appraisal by the pilot concerned.
That is not to say that the cause does not sometimes lie within the skin of the individual.
" Adherence to procedures has nothing to do with competence, and everything to do with self-discipline."
Often, maybe even usually, but far from always. It sometimes has to do with cognitive overload, unrecognised patterns, or perceptual distortions that have situational origins rather than origins to do with psychological or physical limitations of the individual.
" However, I would point out that the underlying philosophy of the NZ CAA leans heavily on the idea that their responsibility extends solely to ensuring that company manuals are up to date, and assumes that the company and the individuals will then always comply with them. At least that is what they told me when offering me an FOI job a few years ago (I didn't take it). A very odd compliance culture."
I fully agree. That is why my work is now entirely in Europe and the USA. Why do I still live here? Lifestyle, and my clients are happy to pay my fares.
" if you are going to suggest that my views are not supported by "psychology, organisational research or aviation accident statistics", perhaps you could indicate what you refer to ".
I was drawing on what you wrote in your earlier posts. You seem to have expanded on what you believe in your most recent post, and that has removed some of the reasons for that critique. However - on the basis of what you have written so far - I still have the following concerns:
(a) on a flight deck (more than in any other workplace in any industry in my view) good training, clear lines of command, SOP's and self discipline are necessary but not sufficient conditions for optimal safe operations. Emotional and physical well being is also required. It is now well over 25 years since the measurement of various of these effects on human performance has been demonstrated and measured. In my view risk management of these factors should be about 30% down to individual professionalism and about 70% to organisational management (provided that licensing, selection and initial training are robust. I personally agree with you that there are good reasons for concern about the first of these in NZ, if not Oz). The actual focus of effort is about the exact reverse proportion:
b) as flight management technology becomes increasingly sophisticated emphasis on flight manuals and SOPs increases, and thereby an increasing focus on adherence to procedures ahead of basic airmanship. A consequence is that aircrew experience is increasingly characterised by intense periods of concentration alternating with periods of very low workloads (although this is not the case in operations such as European and NE USA short haul). The inevitable penalty of this is an increase in attentional lapses, especially during taxiing (the origin of this thread), take off and appraoch and landing. This is well researched, notably in France, and is resulting in 'fewer critical incidents but a greater proportion of them leading to accidents.
Your final point - examples of lack of trust of anonymous reporting procedures are by their very nature hard to come across. When we tried to document it by interviewing UK pilots in known incidents that did not appear in CHIRP all we achieved was to increase the mistrust, so we had to give it away. So I'll have to concede that it is an unproven statement.
You also replied to spllatterbugs:
" In my last job I was in check and training. In JAA land, CRM is assessable on each competency check (ie you could fail the check on CRM). I don't see that over here. Also, there are established courses there such as MCC which don't seem to happen here. A recent type conversion course I did here in NZ had zero CRM/HF content, whereas it would have had a significant element in Euroland. Finally, a few chats with ex-instructor mates from the old days, who are now in the airlines, indicates to me that CRM/HF is given a far lower profile over here. "
I entirely agree with that. But I am disturbed that recent changes by the FAA suggest a drawing back from CRM in Norht America.