I enjoyed (if that is the right word) Air Cdre Blakeley's comments on the book. It seems the bottom line is a suggestion of "faulty navigation" which, to me, is different from "navigation error". The former suggests crew error, while the latter equipment. Maybe just my interpretation. As a sprog I was told, with the CAIP leaflet thrust under my nose, that if crew report a nav error, do a bonding check. Which prompts the question - does the Chinook have a history of poor (or lesser) bonding standards or implementation? No? - OK. Yes? - Reasonable doubt.
If I may add to a couple of subjects discussed by the Air Cdre.
Defect (sic) Reporting. Anyone (including industry) can raise a Fault Report and in bygone days it was more than your job was worth to avoid this obligation. But, it is not the initiator who approves the investigation – that is the role of the MoD’s Technical Agency, who is hamstrung by (a) lack of finance (b) failure of the Service customer to make financial provision to conduct such investigations (c) the increasing attitude within the MoD that the underpinning process (PDS) is a waste of money, which leads to (d) few left who understand. The turning point (around 1991) was when financiers took over and the cost of progressing a MF760 > 760A > 761 was deemed expensive compared to the number of “positive” results obtained. This was defined as the contractor acknowledging liability in the 761 for a design problem (at which points it becomes a “defect” and there follows a defect investigation). Clearly, this financial emphasis completely ignores the purpose of the Fault Reporting system but, when you think about it, it must cost a fortune and be awkward to manage when the aircraft Design Authority is in, for example, Philadelphia. Which is why, in my opinion, it is unfair to point the finger at operators or maintainers. Often, I would ask MoD engineers why they didn’t raise a 760. “Told not to – too expensive”. This may explain why the MoD have so far been unable (but not necessarily unwilling) to divulge certain historical information. There may be none to divulge, and it would be embarrassing to explain why not. Keeping and maintaining such records is part of the Airworthiness audit trail. Ask the right question.
Airworthiness. The Air Cdre clearly knows how Boscombe Down works. Additionally, it is worth noting what is often forgotten – BD make recommendations as to Airworthiness but the MoD Project Manager and the person granting MAR / Airworthiness / Type Approval (almost always different for aircraft, but often the same person for equipment) are under no obligation to accept these recommendations, although clearly mad and immoral if they don’t. This wider aspect never seems to be raised or looked in to, and may be relevant to this thread, and certainly to others. How many “accidents” can be traced to failure to act upon BD advice? Ask BD how often they are ignored and an aircraft or system certified with known safety or functional issues. This is exacerbated by the effective scrapping of the CDS process within MoD, the process for taking corrective action on "highly desirables" and "desirables" which remain post-MAR. But, what price safety?
Sorry, I don’t post often, but when I do it’s long. But, I often think, reading the postings, that there is little depth to technical and, especially, procedural/management discussion, sometimes in favour of an approach which is repetitive and has brought little progress.
T