I though id leave this for the qf captain that decided PA or cabin interphone wasnt that necessary the other day and decided to fly a 737 from NT to SYD
History of the flight
The flight was operating from London (Heathrow) to Kiev and took off at 1445 hrs with the first officer (FO) as the handling pilot. The departure was uneventful until 1458 hrs when, climbing through FL240, the commander heard three or four electrical 'crackling' sounds. Shortly afterwards the cabin call aural warning sounded on the flight deck, but despite several attempts neither pilot was able to establish contact with the cabin crew via the interphone. At about this time the FO noticed a small amount of smoke in the area behind the commander. The commander could not see the smoke but was aware of an electrical burning smell and therefore instructed the FO to don his oxygen mask. The commander put on his own mask and re-established communication with the FO, thus completing the recall items for the 'Electrical Smoke / Fumes or Fire' checklist. He then took control of the aircraft whilst the FO retrieved his Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) in order to complete the remainder of the checklist.
Both pilots were aware of continued banging on the locked cockpit door, which had commenced after their failed attempts to reply to the cabin crew on the interphone. This heightened the pilots' concerns about what was happening, since they were unable to either communicate with the cabin crew or establish the cause of the smoke.
The commander was unsure whether his oxygen hose was long enough to allow him to reach the flight deck door. Therefore, in the absence of any visible smoke, and having briefed the FO, he cautiously removed his mask. He could still smell the smoke but had no difficulty breathing and decided that it was safe to leave his mask off. He went to the door and checked through a peephole for signs of fire or possible intruders. Seeing neither he opened the door and was met by a flow of water coming from a panel in the roof between the forward toilet and the galley. The cabin services director (CSD), who had been the person banging on the door, explained that about fifteen minutes after takeoff he had seen sparks and flames coming from the panel, followed shortly thereafter by a continuous stream of water.
The CSD had attempted to notify the flight deck at the time by using the cabin interphone and had initially heard the commander's voice reply, but the interphone had then ceased working. One of the cabin crew working at the rear of the aircraft then reported to him that the rear galley and some of the cabin lights were no longer working. Another member of the crew turned the water isolation valve off but, despite this, water continued to pour from the roof. Concerned that the water might find its way into the avionics bay the crewmember plugged the gap under the flight deck door with towels. The CSD had then started to bang on the flight deck door in an attempt to get the pilots' attention and, looking through the peephole, could see that both pilots were wearing their oxygen masks. Still unable to establish communications with the flight deck the CSD gathered the cabin crew together in the forward galley to explain the situation and to brief them for an anticipated return to Heathrow. It was at this point that the commander opened the flight deck door.
After satisfying himself that he was fully informed of the situation in the cabin, and that there was no longer any fire, the commander briefed the CSD that they would be returning to Heathrow and advised him to prepare for a possible emergency evacuation. The commander also told him that he would make an announcement to the passengers.
Before the commander left the flight deck in order to check the cabin, the aircraft had been levelled at FL260 and ATC notified that they had a "technical problem". No emergency had been declared at this point since the flight crew were still unsure of the situation in the cabin. However, whilst the commander was in the cabin ATC asked whether they wished to declare an emergency. The FO replied that they did and on a further suggestion from the controller agreed to commence a turn towards Stansted Airport, which was then about 55 nm to the west.
When he returned to his seat the commander decided to leave his oxygen mask off since there was now no smell of any smoke. He instructed the FO to remove his oxygen mask, in order to facilitate communications, before briefing him on the situation in the cabin. The commander then declared a MAYDAY, requesting an immediate diversion to Heathrow. This was acknowledged by ATC and new vectors were given for them to fly. The crew then completed the remainder of the smoke checklist from the QRH and the commander briefed for a monitored approach for an ILS to Runway 27R at Heathrow, with the FO flying the approach and the commander taking control for the landing.
Meanwhile, after being informed of their intention to return to Heathrow the CSD had commenced briefing the passengers for a precautionary landing. Since the cabin interphone was not working he decided the most expeditious method was to arrange for the four cabin crew members to walk through the cabin personally briefing the passengers. Having done this they isolated the cabin electrical services and the CSD went onto the flight deck to inform the commander that the cabin had been secured for landing. The commander had previously explained the situation to the passengers, successfully using the public address (PA) system but he told the CSD that should the system subsequently fail and in the absence of any other instruction the doors should be left in 'auto' after landing. The CSD then returned to the cabin and the cabin crew took their seats for landing.
During the approach the commander requested that the ILS be protected so that they would be able to carry out an autoland should the smoke return and their view be restricted. ATC replied that a CAT III ILS would be available but that protection could not be guaranteed: they also advised that a surveillance radar approach would be available if necessary. The approach was continued and the commander took control at 1,000 feet and completed a normal landing, bringing the aircraft to a halt on the runway, as requested by ATC. The FO, as briefed, then went immediately into the cabin to check for any more signs of fire. There were none, and the commander relayed this information to the fire services who were now at the aircraft and speaking to the commander on a discreet frequency.
The fire service requested that the engines be shut down before carrying out an external check for signs of fire or damage. None were found and they boarded the aircraft and used thermal imaging equipment to look for hot areas in the ceiling. Again none were found but, on pulling down the damaged ceiling panel, a burnt wiring loom could be seen. Next to this was the water supply hose to the forward galley, from which water was still pouring. Whilst the fire crews were investigating the source of the fire the passengers were disembarked from the rear of the aircraft onto awaiting buses, following which the aircraft was towed clear of the runway.
Sorry for the length but i hope the message sinks in to some.