A/my simplistic analysis perhaps...
If you remove one causal event in the sequence of events that led to this accident, a different outcome would almost certainly have been guaranteed.
Fuel is a red-herring for me. I agree it would probably have been prudent to take a little more. There is nothing to suggest that even if G-BYAG had had block+10T onboard the same sequence of events would not have transpired.
The aircraft had fuel for LEBL. It would therefore appear reasonable to assume LFMP and LERS, albeit he'd be on vapour by the time he got there. In all cases, except perhaps LEBL, he'd have been <E @ ETA.
However, he could have committed himself to LEGE.
The outcome in the event of exercising any of these options is pure speculation.
The difference in attitude towards fuel policy between various posters reflects the difference in experience. Just a thought.
If you regularly operate full 735's on 1000NM sectors to/from hot performance restrictive fields, you will know that you are regularly up against RTOW limits. This precludes the carriage of alot extra.
You are then constantly weighing up how many bags to offload versus how much fuel to carry. The most I have been involved in offloading is 900KG out of LSGG purely to allow an equivalent extra uplift of fuel.
The point being that it must be the case that operational constraints allow some pilots less room for manoeuvre than others, whereupon the pressure they are under is greater than others.
IMHO though, the fuel state may have been contributory but not causal.
Neither is the fatigue issue causal. At best contributory. CAP371/FTL limitations ensure corporate culpability on this matter would probably be hard to prove. Even QinetiQ/NASA research brought to bear on the recent debate about FTL limitations has struggled to achieve credibility with the Commission. For all the wrong reasons perhaps...
It would appear that if fatigue is ever an issue, it is up to the individual concerned, bearing in mind the responsible nature of his job, to offload himself. If he doesn't, struggles through the duty, and has a CFIT inicident, then arguably he has only himself to blame with all the associated drastic consequences.
If the skipper himself says he wasn't fatigued, (Pg 7 of the report explicitly states this to be the case of both individuals concerned), lets consider that to be the case.
However, what seems to me to be causal in the event is the failure to GA when visual contact was lost. There was still 6 secs before touchdown to initiate a GA.
And this is an incident that reaffirms the sense in executing a GA in conditions where the visual reference is lost and reminds me not to be afraid to use TOGA. In fact, funnily enough, having reflected on this very matter last week, I almost did exactly that recently into EGFF in torrential rain.
But I'll have to keep remembering not to confuse TOGA with the A/T disconnect.
