Bally Heck,
I bow to your superior knowledge on the B757 and your observation about the EPR setting on the approach just prior to the Commander disconnecting the A/T.
My own limited observation on the A/T aspect was this:
I am also surprised that the A/T could not handle the speed sufficiently well in the relatively smoother conditions on the ILS such that the F/O called, “bug minus 10” after the OM and then again, “bug minus 5” and then the Power Levers were advanced – it is unclear from the report if that was by physical intervention by the Commander or the A/T system itself, as the report mentions the A/P and A/T being disconnected 4 seconds after that minus 5 speed call (21.46:58) and some 26 seconds after the Commander called, “Lights in sight” (21.46:32).
Your point about a,
very big burst of windshear
is not lost on me.
I'm still wondering why just after the OM the A/T was not responding very well to speed loss.
The last EPR setting was, as point out, quite a handfull.
Certainly the large power change would not be helpful nor contribute to a stable approach when needed most - but the loss of visual clues at the very same time added to this poor chaps problems; the application of near full down elevator fills in the story.
TG