BOAC
It would appear that your are striving in vain. It seems strange that the fatigue aspect of the incident is being overlooked by the majority of posters, especially since there have been numerous threads on this BB recently about his very subject, some quite voiciferous. We appear to be concentrating on how much fuel the commander chose to carry and how much more we would have uplifted in the circumstances. Did fatigue play a part in the commanders decision on fuel, one wonders? If the commander had uplifted more fuel would the outcome have been any different?
There are plenty of scary comments about flying when fatigued, but what about the implications of planning when fatigued? It is said that familiarity breeds contempt, what happens when familiarity is coupled with fatigue, especially when reading met briefings prior to a flight. What do you think when you read an all too familiar TAF for an airfield of TEMPO VRB20 TSRA OVC500? Do you take in what the TAF is telling you or is it pushed to one side with an confident look and a "Been there in worse" thought?