Click here for a link to an interesting article on MASC :
MASC
I have put this link in for three reasons. Firstly it is of interest in its own right, and connected to carrier issues. Secondly it has been mentioned before on this thread. Thirdly, it (and also the Sea King ASaC7 of today) is a good example. It extends the range of a task force/group's sensors by virtue of altitude and mobility, and at the same time is still an organic naval asset - with the advantages that brings.
In the last few years, the UK has spent a large amount of time, effort and money to increase the ability we have to operate in the littoral, and particularly to conduct ampbious operations. Our
Amphibious Forces have been updated and upgraded, with a new LPH, two new LPD(R)s, new RFA LSD(A)s to carry more troops and equipment in amphibious operations, new landing craft with greater capacity and extended range, new Ro Ro vessels and various other things.
Look at this
page from the RN website.
Their usefulness derives mainly from their ability to concentrate a balanced force at a chosen point on a coastline or to deter aggression by providing a potent independent UK presence off shore in an area of regional tension.
Note the inclusion of the word "independent".
Use of force in this way would preclude the use of offensive weapons. But to be credible such a task group would need the ability to protect itself from air/missile attack (and other threats as well of course).
Thus the premature retirement of the Sea Harrier considerably reduces the usefulness of our amphibious forces as a tool of UK policy. The savings should been seen in the light of the hundreds, if not thousands, of millions of Pounds spent of amphibious things.