Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[walter kennedy]

I’ll keep it brief. The Boeing document I refer to below is NOT A SIMULATION, it is
Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data
8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4
Dated: June 18,2002 prepared by
James Mitchell
Technical Fellow
The Boeing Company
It is downloadable from the web – it reconstructs the flight from the available data in a way that the reader can check out for himself – recommended for anyone interested in this crash.
Of special interest is the waypoint change:
Up to that point, the a/c appeared to have been keeping to its track;
On changing to the next waypoint in the TANS (which gave a required steer to the LEFT of some 7 deg) the a/c turned RIGHT 3 deg and maintained this track until the final flare;
The strength of the Boeing analysis is that, on that final leg, there was insufficient time (as they were already pretty much on their top cruising speed) to have done much significant maneuvering prior to that final flare other than to have kept to track;
To have turned consciously to the right of the original track suggests that they were not merely plodding on but completing this leg using a different reference point;
As this track does not take them to the lighthouse but rather inland of it suggests that they were not aiming at the lighthouse visually (why would they take a course to the right – into danger – if they had seen it) – don’t forget, this track was initiated at waypoint change when everyone is in agreement that they must have been in control with no apparent problems or they would not have been bothering with changing the en route waypoint in the TANS;
The SAR system I have referred to gives a bearing to the transponder (albeit at +/- 4 deg not as good as a fixed VOR, but useful);
Their actions at waypoint change were entirely consistent with taking up on a transponder near the Mull lighthouse (giving range AND a bearing);
And I challenge anyone to come up with a reasonable alternative.

I believe that this argument is strong enough to have justified its consideration at the inquiries – ignorance of a system that has been used in SAR and special forces helicopters in NATO countries since the 1980s is inexcuseable.