Crossunder and Phoenix_x, I could argue that the A320 in question has a type of "land mode". I apologize for not being familiar enough with all of the Airbus flight modes, so I don't know the term for the below 100ft flight mode. However clearly a "mode change" occurred at 100ft, where automatic TOGA thrust was no longer available.
With all of the FBW automatics incorporated into both Boeing and Airbus aircraft, I think it's the complexity of the system "mode changes" that needs to be well understood. To me, a "mode change" happens when the behavior of the FBW automatics change, when passing through a certain trigger event. When a "mode change" occurs, the system behavior changes, and the new "mode" must be properly identified and its behavior must be well understood. The challenge for the new FBW "system manager" type of pilot, is to be completely familiar with the system behavior in all possible system "modes", and all events that trigger a change to new a "mode".
My problem with the "Bus" philosophy is that there are so many of these system "mode changes" and a fairly large number of "trigger" events that cause the "mode changes". It's a lot to keep up with, especially when an unnoticed "mode change" can get you into trouble (as was the case with the above mentioned A320 accident, and the recent A340 incident at Johannesburg).
Please understand that I'm not "Bus" bashing here, instead I'm interested in possible design problems that can result from the various control system design philosophies.