PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Report on 1999 B757 crash at Girona finally published
Old 6th Sep 2004, 11:02
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M.Mouse

Controversial, moi?
 
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Phoenix Son

Not wishing to start an interminable debate about the 'monitered approach' but given the unfortunate set of circumstances that prevailed it is my belief (I have around 15,000 hours experience) that it would have allowed the Captain to reduce his obviously considerable workload.

Similar in some respects to the actions of the Captain involved in British Midland Kegworth crash where the Captain also elected to fly the aeroplane while at the same time managing a very difficult situation.

It is BA policy, in circumstances where a situation develops requiring managarial oversight, that control of the aircraft is handed to the FO. He is competent to fly the aircraft as instructed, or required by a procedure, and it allows the Captain that all important space which is needed to maintain an overview and make decisions accordingly. We also employ the monitored approach as an SOP and in the circumstances of the Girona flight I know which procedure I would have preferred.

It was my first thought that the fuel carried was not overly generous for the forecast weather. 15 minutes extra is not a lot when one considers

TEMPO is used to describe changes which are expected to last for periods of 30 minutes or more but less than one hour in each instance, and which in aggregate are not expected to cover more than half the total period for which the TEMPO is indicated.
There IS huge pressure from management in many companies not to carry excessive amounts of fuel.

Diversions create delays, costs and high workload. No doubt the wish to not divert lead to a strong desire to get in from the second approach. One has to ask the question if the aircraft was carrying another 30 mins of holding fuel would the crew have elected to make the approach when they did?

All personal opinion from the comfort of my study and I don't believe that a pilot alive does not feel for the situation that the crew found themselves in that fateful evening and it is a small mercy that the accident, bad as it was, did not turn into a massive tragedy.

A final comment. I don't doubt the competency of the FO you observed when jump seating and I have rarely flown with an FO who gives me reason to doubt that competency but there is a world of difference between competency and experience. Something not fully appreciated until having that experience! The 1500 hours of the flying that the BY FO had would have covered a huge variety of often demanding flying that the BY network provides.
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