I'm actually reading over the report again right now, and the impression I'm getting is that the crew could have done some things slightly diferrent, but ultimately the MAIN factors seem to be the runway lights going out at the critical point where the PF is looking for visual cues(the lights came back on by emergency power within the 15second period required, but too late...), and the "sink rate" warning sounding over the last few rad alt callouts.
The crew screwed up big time - and there's little point in playing the "anyone else's fault but the pilot's" card here.
These comments I find too harsh, and I'm wondering if Joyce Tick has actually read the conclusions/findings of the investigation on the flight crew (page 88-would post them but can't seem to copy the text
) or if he/she has made their own conclusions! especially as the report suggests that another (of the many) factors may have been the crew/airlines non-requirement to train go-around proceedures below minimums, the PF's apparent "shock" at the runway lights going out at that stage may have been reduced to some extent.
The sad thing is that the report says that if the nose landing gear support structure hadn't have displaced the control/thrust lever control cables in such way , the aircraft may have just come to an eventual stop on it's nose on the runway. The displacement of the thrust cables caused an increase in thrust, which literally powered the aircraft on into the actual events that occured thereafter. All in all, many factors from not only within the cockpit contributed to the incident, including bad luck!!!!! though it still amazes me to this day how there was no loss of life or very serious injury (at the time
), and I would hope that the crew can carry on their career with greater knowledge of such situations leading up to the event, I'm certainly not worried if I'm ever sat behind them if I was pax on their flight...