h1tman47 , I make no claims of expertise in aviation psychology, but reading the standard texts suggest that there is a direct link between SA and information processing. In addition, I would conclude that the association between SA and information processing is critical in a multi-crew environment.
For background reference, see:
- The ESSAI project (Working Paper 1)
- RAeS Human Factors Group, Conference on Situation Assessment and Decision-Making, May 2001.
- Publications section of Mica Endsley’s website: www.satechnologies.com/html/overview.html
- Paper on Non Adherence to Procedures by A Karwal given at a Flight Safety Foundation conference
From Karwal’s paper, several problems in information processing are identified.
- Failures in the input from the senses; relevant information is not seen or incorrect information used. Problems with illusions etc.
- Failures in pattern matching; the misperception of information. Procedure design (input senses, interpretation), Experience / training (long term memory), Cultural aspects (influencing factors), Personality aspects / attitudes (influencing factors) and aspects of the situation itself.
- Problems also arise from inappropriate attention; the incorrect allocation of attention resources, focus of attention. Stress fatigue, Personality aspects / attitudes.
I would include failures in decision making because SA relates to projecting a course of action (gathering, understanding, and planning ahead), feed back from the action is sensed, which closes the information processing loop.
An interesting paper “Errors in Aviation Decision Making: A Factor in Accidents and Incidents”, Judith Orasanu, Lynne Martin, NASA-Ames Research Center, gives another view of the failures in information processing and SA.
- The situations were not recognized as ones that should trigger a change of course of action, due to the ambiguity of the cues;
- Risk was underestimated;
- Goals conflicted (safety vs. productivity, mission completion or social factors);
- Consequences were not anticipated or evaluated.
For ambiguity “Cues that signal a problem are not always clear-cut. Conditions can deteriorate gradually, and the decision maker's situation assessment may not keep pace. If events occur infrequently, the decision maker may not have amassed the experience to recognize the signals associated with a different course of action. Flight crews are typically in a "go" frame of mind. A substantial weight of evidence is needed to change the plan being executed. Weather and certain system malfunctions can change dynamically and pose a challenge for situation assessment. For decisions that have consequences, such as rejecting a takeoff or diverting, the decision maker needs to justify a course of action that may entail a cost. If the situation is ambiguous, the decision is harder to justify than if the situation is clear-cut, which may work against a decision to change the course of action.”
The paper proposes that improvements in decision making should come from improved SA, that in turn requires improved displays (high quality information) and better training – directed training to give experience; and in the judgment of risk and time (time management).
Many of the problems in mental processing as above could apply directly to a multi-crew environment, particularly if the crew is considered an entity of information processing; i.e. the group suffers the same failures as an individual. In addition, there is the need for individuals to share mental models to achieve collective agreement; this involves communication and other CRM aspects – individual resource management.
A primary defence within threat and error management is cross monitoring; thus, a failure in one individual’s SA should be detected by another crewmember, and an alert should be given – or question asked. It is essential for all crewmembers to realise that until they establish a common mental model of the situation that they are likely to have differing views of a situation and hence differing strategies; CRM again – group resource management.