STL, you raise an interesting point and one that is not generally understood by the casual observer; it is not a question whether the regulatory authorities are simple or not (your judgement) but that regulations for certification and operations are differently applied.
Firstly certification (I have to say, not my forte):
If one were to examine FAR 27/29 one would be forgiven for assuming that any new helicopter (not new type) would be built to the standard that is seen. You will have observed from this thread that such an assumption would be false; the only way to establish the certification standard of the aircraft is to examine the TCDS (and as we have discovered, this might not tell the whole story as an individual aircraft might include a crashworthy floor, stroking seats and any number of STCs) - this information will be given in the C of A and the Flight Manual. Thus (simplistically) any change to the certification codes will only come into effect when a new type is certificated. (when the present round of new development has been completed, when will the next medium helicopter be produced - 2020?)
If one wanted to establish the certification status of any aircraft type for reasons of comparison, it would require a reconstruction of the certification code that existed at the time that the aircraft was awarded its type certificate - including any methods of compliance given in the AC. Why would anyone want to conduct such an academic exercise? Well I have already given you the answer to that in a previous post; at least one major oil company is producing a mathematical model to establish the safety benefits (and costs) of moving from old to newer technology on a number of their contracts. As the oil companies have various worthwhile causes competing for their budget, a shift to newer technology will have to be justified on a standard accounting basis. The certification status will be one of many elements that will have to be considered - for the GOM, the number of engines and pilots will also be part of that calculation.
I think that it has already been established without doubt that FAR 29 - from the revision status that obtained when the S92 was given its type certificate - will result in much safer aircraft. That is why Eurocopter has gone out of its way, and beyond that which is required for upgrading an existing type, to meet newer certification requirements. The discussion that we have seen on this thread has been a journey of exploration into some of these voluntary upgrades that have been applied - and very illuminating it has been. So you can see, no sleight of hand is required that’s the way the system works - could it be any other way?
I think it is quite clear that the S92 is a new civil type - using tried and tested components found to have been cost effective in previous designs. The EC255 is not a new civil type but EC has found it appropriate to apply the newest standards where it is technically feasible and economically justifiable.
Now for operations (of which I have a little knowledge):
When examining Annex 6 Part III, FAR 91, 135, JAR-OPS 3 etc. it is entirely clear what operational rules apply (well perhaps not that clear - for which I have to take some of the blame). Unless a rule is specifically directed at the date of the Individual C of A it will apply to all (aircraft, operator, pilots) who have to comply with the regulations.
Let’s take an example (and one which is coming gradually into play in this thread) FAR 29.1 establishes that the S92 has to be certificated in Category A; what does that mean? Well leaving aside any airworthiness elements (which are extremely important in themselves) Nick has indicated that it required a quick and simple Category A procedure to be incorporated into the Flight Manual. However, the fact that the aircraft has been certificated in Category A is only the entry price as far as ICAO and European regulations are concerned it is the operational code that establishes how the aircraft is to be operated.
All of those of you who operate offshore will know that Operations in Performance Class 1 to a helideck is not always possible (due to the size, the obstacles, the environment etc) - even though it might be hugely desirable. No Category A procedure can cope with all of the elements extant in offshore take-off and landing. The present European code permits (until 2010) operations in Performance Class 2 - with exposure. As Nick has pointed out in his last post ‘progress has to be made’; it is clear, even though operation in Performance Class 1 is not always possible, operations with zero exposure are possible using risk assessed procedures and data produced by the manufacturers from models validated with limited flight data - at very little extra cost in the provision of data and little or no cost in reduction of payload.
HC in one of his latest posts, quite clearly indicated that the data required to fly zero exposure procedures is closely related to the OEI OGE hover performance; other features such as the NR beep or the (automatic) NR+10 of the EC225 provide stored energy. The combination of these elements (and the use of appropriate take-off and landing procedures) by utilising vertical acceleration and stored energy will give zero exposure by ensuring deck-edge clearance and minimising drop down. The operational code (unless otherwise stated) can make that a requirement for all aircraft at any stage; all that is required is that stake holders agree to the required changes.
Even if such changes to the operational code are not made (which is unlikely), customers are likely to require such performance as part of their duty of care to their passengers and responsibility to their share-holders.
I disagree with STL's "O.K. Enough already" - let the debate continue.