This from WOrkER posted 5th August 2004
<<Do note, however, that we want to see facts only. And you will need also to explain why your analysis of whatever facts you identify carries more weight than the analysis of the air staffs of the MOD and HQSTC, the reviewing officers and three successive CASs.>>
Well, here's a fact for you that did not get much of a mention by those authoritive bodies to which you refer:
Helicopters en route from NI to the mainland REGULARLY approached at low level, at speed, to make a turn actually on the shoreline in the same conditions as prevailed for ZD576s last flight.
Below I explain where I got this from:
I was standing once, talking to the lighthousekeeper (a man who would have spent a lot of time there), a little way up the slope from the lighthouse to the crashsite, at a point where the rising air started forming thick mist so that one was just loosing sight of the sea (a bit higher up, no vis; a bit lower, see for miles), we heard a helicopter approach at speed (but never saw it) and it turned steeply very close to us continuing up the shoreline, "they do that all the time" he said pointing out the prominent large rock that was usually the turning point (not the lighthouse itself), and this in the near identical conditions as on that fateful day - which is not that much of a coincidence bearing in mind how prevalent such conditions are in that locality, "they" being who? - is this a major civvy route for helicopters?? I ask this toungue in cheek because no one yet has owned up to it being the practice for military helicopters en route from NI to the mainland (even the belated begrudgingly brief acknowledgements to "handrailing" do not give the detail especially in regard of how close in they turned), and no clear statement has been made (to my knowledge) that these conditions were common (clear at sea but the Mull cloaked in ground hugging mist obscurring detail) indeed the official line seems intended to give the public the impression that the aircraft was ploughing through murk when in fact visibilty was excellent except for the ground detail being obscurred, now of all those helicopters who "... do that all the time" some must have been done it in those common conditions (like the one I witnessed) and there is no way that it would have been safe to have approached the Mull at speed to make such a turn relying on visual references or any GPS based system as just a few hundred metres error in judging the turn would have resulted in the same fate as that of ZD576, which brings me to the point what were they using, if you could get a signal form the MAC TACAN you could count down the distance to go to the turn (DME functions are normally very accurate if you get coverage and if you dont you just dont use it) but it is not at all clear that you could get the MAC TACAN at their altitude and approach direction, which is why I ask if there had been any other DME set suitably located for such flights so obvious would its utility have been.
From a navigation systems point of view, I would have thought the possibilty of using DME would have been perfectly reasonable and worth exploring. However, rather than explore this and help find out one way or the other, energies appear to be directed at avoiding it as if it were the plague. An example is this excerpt below from a recent posting:
This from John Purdey posted 6th August 2004
<<The other theories very from the improbable to the impossible; for example, we actually have one contributor who thinks that
a sabateur MAY have planted a mobile beacon beyond the hills so as to seduce the crew into flying towards that beacon, and thus into the high ground.
This means that he knew the aircraft was going to fly this mission, with those passengers, on that stretch of the route,
and in doubtful weather,
and that after the crash he would dismantle his mobile transmitter and disappear. I ask you!>>
I will try to address these points JP makes in - you may find it interesting how extreme the spin is bearing in mind that my reasoning has been put in some detail in several posts over a fair amount of time:
(Basically, I have been suggesting that the a/c was flying in good VFR conditions apart from the Mull's ground detail being obscurred (as was commonly the case) and, given the "end on" approach direction, there would not have been the topography for spatial awareness for the last mile or so until very close in such that shoreline detail would have been clear enough - at their speed, they would have had to have been using something else to judge their distance for starting that critical turn so close in as it was - DME the obvious choice - just for that one point in an otherwise easy VFR flight.)
I had suggested that, if the MAC TACAN was not useable on this leg (and no one has confirmed or denied this satisfactorily yet) a portable DME (only) could have been set up for the use of such (regular) flights (for this local awkward bit) - whichever, my point was that such ground equipment would have been very easy to tamper with to give a false distance reading and not that some other equipment had been carried in as JPs 1st point; the saboteur would not have needed to be very technical to have altered the internal time delay in the existing equipments; I think this answers his last point too.
As to knowing who was on board, the route, ETA at the Mull etc - well, if it was done this way then there is only one answer, isn't there? - and the implications of this are very serious, which is why it needs to be explored to closure. But this is the crux of this debate - the unwillingness to confront one obvious method because of the implications - surely try to explore all reasonably possible causes first - be objective - be politically correct later, if you chose, but have the balls to ask your colleagues for the facts - if they were using a DME reading then at least there would be grounds to discredit early findings as this would have been pertinent, surely?
"... and in doubtful weather..." I take it you mean the localised mist on the Mull - it was perfectly clear at low level out to sea - and, well, you could almost count on it being like that so prevalent were those local conditions at that time - a free shot anyway, if conditions had been good on the Mull and the distance reading not watched closely then the anomaly may not have been noticed.