Dick Pressure
Dick, sorry but I found the evidence I was looking for to demonstrate your actions when it comes to NAS and safety design in Australian Airspace reforms and government influence
I have found the correspondence that I referred to previously with regards to Dick Smith and his attempt to influence government decisions re NAS
The first letter dated 11th December to Ken Matthews Secretary of DOTaRS and chairman of ARG
Dear Ken
Recently on the Professional Pilots/ Rumour Network (PPRuNe), a pilot operating under the pseudonym "CaptainMidnight" quoted a summary of responses in relation to the CASR Part 71 documentation.
"Quote : Comment 47 - Mandatory Broadcast Zones (MBZ - non-ICAO - MOS Park 71 paragraph 2.2.10 (page 2-4)
CASA Response
CASA acknowledges that MBZs are not ICAO compliant in that they require carriage and use of radio by VFR flights in Class G airspace... Initially, the ARM (Airspace Risk Model) was used to model the difference in risk between MBZs and CTAFs. It found that for a given traffic level and mix, and MBZ reduced risk by a factor of about three or four."
Ken, I understand that this ARM document is flawed. It used subjective opinions of airline pilots when deciding the chance of a pilot misdialling a frequency. Also the people in charge of the risk modelling would not accept the "diffusion of responsibilty" issue where a pilot puts extra reliance on radio arranged separation when he or she believes that a mandatory requirement improves compliance.
This issue must be resolved urgently. It is simply not possible for us to go to the US CTAF system if CASA continues to claim that this will mean a reduction in safety.
Could this be discussed at the next ARF meeting so that the matter can be urgently resolved?
Yours faithfully,
Dick Smith
This second letter is dated 18 March 2003 to Ken Matthews
Dear Ken
I refer to my letter to you dated 11 December 2002 in relation to the airspace risk model and MBZs. I believe this issue must be resolved urgently. Would you be able to discuss the matter with Mike Smith and see how we can move forward?
I have recently been told that when the ARM was prepared, that the airline pilots who sat on the panel were by no means objective - in fact, they had stated aim to keep MBZs. This is hardly a way to do a scientific study.
I also understand that this flawed document has been unknowingly accepted by ICAO as the basis for airspace risk modelling. MBZs do not comply with ICAO airspace classifications, let alone accepted world practice.
I will look forward to this issue being resolved urgently.
Yours faithfully
Dick Smith
IT SEEMS KEN WAS NOT MOVING IN THE REQUIRED DIRECTION FAST ENOUGH!!
This is the third letter dated 12 June 2003 to Peter Langhorne, Chief of Staff
Dear Peter,
The management of Broome Airport and others have recently been made aware of the CASA claim that MBZs are three or four times safer than CTAFs. This is the prime reason they are lobbying the Western Australian government to keep MBZ procedures at Broome Airport.
I attach two letters to Ken Matthews written many months ago in relation to this. I particularly point out the paragraphs
"This issue must be resolved urgently. It is simply not possible to go to the US CTAF system if CASA continues to claim that this will mean a reduction in safety."
Peter, it is imperative that this claim in the ARM be corrected.
Yours faithfully
Dick Smith
THE COPY OF MR ANDERSON'S LETTER WAS HIGHLY CENSORED BUT IT SHEDS AN INTERESTING LIGHT ON DICK'S ATTITUDE TO A D.A.S.
The fourth letter is from John Anderson to Dick Smith dated 3 July 2003
Dear Mr Smith
......I am also advised that Airservices Australia (AA) and NAS IG will be conducting a design analysis of the characteristics to be introduced in stage 2b, using the Safety Case Analysis and Review Determination (SCARD) methodology. This analysis will determine whether a design safety case would be required for any characteristic depending on the risk level identified.
I have noted your concern that if a design safety case is performed for the US CTAF procedure, it will not be accepted by CASA. I would like to assure you that should the SCARD analysis identify the need for a design safety case for any NAS characteristic, it must and will be developed and examined in a transparent manner.........
Dick, who claims he does not use undue influence, jumps over his own Chairman and goes to the Dep PM Cheif of Staff!!
In the reply to Dick from the Dep PM(signed by Anderson) he notes Dick's concern "..that if a design safety case is performed for the US CTAF procedure it will not be acceptable to CASA!!!!
So you do not do a design case as you are afraid of the results?- and you bag the ARM (which used actual monitored non call DATA at a number of a/p to get the non compliance figures) and later bag our BME DAS using non-industry experts and members of the skeptics,then bag Dr Fulton who audited our preliminary report to the Chairman on the CSIRO.
NOW YOU CLAIM YOU DO NOT USE ANY INFLUENCY AND ADVOCATE A STUDIED APPROACH
You can not claim any moral ground on these matters or expect ppruners to believe your arguments and statements on design analysis and no influence on Government and its bureaucracy when this evidence is available to show otherwise.
I also note like Mike Smith you were looking at a CTAF for Broome and now it has lept to a tower when the facts showed a CTAF was not acceptable.
Mike Caplehorn
Chairman BIA Group