What i care about is the way you are attacking two of my colleagues who apparently have paid a very high price for following company direction.
My friend, Aviation is a tough world and you need some lateral thinking here.
I criticize the EK training department and consequently but “indirectly” the crew.
Nothing will change within EK without pressure from outside; pilots are simply too scared to speak up.
The pilots have been fired and if you think they had any chance to be treated correctly then you are having an illusion. I have advised them to get out of the country as quickly as possible.
I do have a whole library here behind me but I have not opened a single book so far.
The fact that I do have this library speaks for itself. So this time I will give you some info from them.
It is known that professionals; doctors, pilots and others that need to make decisions based upon many parameters tend to revert to a heuristic thinking process, whereby, in most cases they get the right diagnosis but sometimes they get it completely wrong. Therefore it is advised that they check their initial thinking process trough via an algorithmic model in order to get their facts right.
In other words:
1. Heuristic model
Capt thinks A,B,C + F/O thinks C, D, E = decision based on A,B,C,D,E
2. Trained by both capt and f/o) algorithmic model A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
Capt thinks A,B,C,E,F,G,H + F/O suggests to capt “I think you forgot D”
If you apply this also in daily operation it will become second nature you may also elect to put in the QRH. Human performance declines under stress, this model fills the gaps. It may be subject to improvement. It suposes that one is familiar with the basics of aviation.
The model that I proposed is not something that I have invented overnight; it was used as a standard model, incorporated in the FOM. It does not need complicated calculations but highlights the importance of all factors. It reduces stress and gets the whole crew and environment involved. I can assure you that it received a lot of criticism but in the end it proved it’s value and was accepted.
While I was with EK I was in contact with the specialist from Boeing on human factors who was working in the University of Delft on cockpits of the future on a B 777 platform called the SIMONA project.
EK was starting to fly mixed types, Airbus and Boeing and the man was prepared to get involved with a study on SOP in such an environment.
EK, “read the GMFO” refused for obvious reasons.
What happened in reality on this read is that I have applied my model while I am not even qualified on the aircraft. What this means in practical terms is the following.
If a complete layman would have been sitting on that flight deck with the algorithm in his hands and worked trough it, like if it was a checklist and challenge the captain with every decision he has made, would they have had a better situation awareness or not and taken another decision?
In the end my posts did exactly that and the data came on the table. Take it for what it is worth but I may have done you guys a big favour.
Perception is not always reality. This crew did not land on the longest runway available with known brakes and flap problems and were very lucky to walk away from it alive. Their future lives may well be traumatised till the end and those remaining in EK should be grateful if the system improves.
Unfortunately that’s the way things are.