Dick
Thanks for your reply and clarifying the difference between alerted see-and-avoid and radio-arranged separation.
In my experience, alerted see-and-avoid does not provide a complete outcome - perhaps it is inherent to Australian aviation culture, but IFR pilots who are have been alerted to traffic often try and communicate with the said traffic (if not within the confines of an MBZ or CTAF) on the area frequency to determine each other's intentions and to self-separate. They are eagerly monitoring their TCAS (for those fortunate enough to have it) to determine the proximity of the traffic and whether any avoiding action is in fact required.
Don't forget, alerted see-and-avoid can only occur in an environment where there is adequate surveillance. You say that there is plenty of "non-RADAR Class E" in the US - and therefore I presume unalerted see-and-avoid (or is there VFR flight following in this non-RADAR airspace? Please explain).
I therefore ask you the following:
You have implied from previous posts that the three Virgin incidents which have occurred post Nov 27 have been blown out of proportion. The crucial incident (IMHO) was the Christmas eve incident at LT: unalerted see-and-avoid, resulting in a TCAS RA. The ATSB report indicates that the Tobago pilot mis-judged the anticipated profile of the jet. The ATSB report also states that at no time did the Virgin pilots ever see the traffic.
1. Did TCAS save a potential collision? (or was it Big Sky Theory?)
2. Why has Launceston magically benn provided with RADAR surveillance? Surely if non-RADAR Class E airspace is part of the overall NAS design, and therefore "safe"*, then this measure should not have been necessary?
3. What if (as you say in the US system) there was no mandatory transponder requirement - what in your opinion would have occurred?
4. Based on your answers to 1,2 and 3, do you think that this is an acceptable level of safety?
* by risk-analysis standards