Ark Royal
“There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.”
Well, after what happened to Airey Neave (very much of the same attitude as that team) someone should have considered a threat from our “friends” – you know, the ones who when challenged about being on the crash site before our services said that they were “…looking for our stuff”. But I agree with FJJP on this, as he says:
“I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum”
– I agree that this thread should be kept to what happened to the flight – but that causes of the crash that could only result from sabotage should not be dismissed off hand – we need to establish what happened and this can lead to other debate elsewhere. For me, the real investigation into what went on only starts with the determination of what happened to the Chinook.
“They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.”
But they were flying in clear air with the sea and the Mull visible – it was how they were judging the distance off the Mull before starting their turn that I wish to get clarified.
kilo52
“How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that were the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.”
Certainly, I believe that the approach to the Mull and the close in turn to run up the coast was part of a regular flight plan and it is the details for this portion of such a regular flight plan that would be of great interest to many of us. What did the 2nd crew’s map show? – a low level turn up the coast or a climb over? I have said before that at the point that they had changed the waypoint in the TANS – which suggests that they were in control and under no duress at that point – they were already rather too close to make a smooth climb over without perturbing their cruise speed and so I believe that it was their intention to turn up the coast (a common practice). The arguments that they had selected an inappropriate rate of climb etc because they had found themselves in poor visibility are odd – the mist was very close to the ground, forming as the air rose over the Mull (localised on the hazard), and so it would have been too late by then – turning too late was the problem, as I see it.
I recall the question of crew duty hours at the FAI – the OC of Aldergrove (if I recall correctly) stated that they would have been over the ten (?) hours allowed for the NI theatre if going all the way to Ft George and stated that no request for extension was asked. However, they would have been within their hours to get to, say, Macrihanish. I do not know if a short break of a couple of hours would have allowed a continuation later. This, together with the golf equipment, rather suggests that they were going up the coast – I have heard that stopovers on that golf course had been done before.
FJJP
“It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.” Well, I just suggested that you (or anyone else who had contacts with relevantly experienced aircrew) in effect directed your energies outward to help bring this issue to closure as opposed to getting frustrated arguing here with what limited information we have as I recall that you expressed frustration with this debate.
“Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - …… But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.”
I anticipated this perfectly rational reaction to the quoting of any conclusions by Boeing – but I referred to the analysis by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company who in great detail works out the dynamics of the flight from the available data – I highly recommend all interested in this debate to download it – it is also the only written reference that I have come across which raises the question of the TACAN CU being set for ch107 (and this document only came out in 2002, as I recall).
If you have sufficient time and motivation you can follow the calculations through yourself – I found them to be quite reasonable.
The point that I was drawing from this Boeing work is that the a/c had not had time to deviate from its path significantly – it was already at the top end of its cruise speed and would not have been able to get to where it did if it had deviated as there was no reserve of speed to recover to the path on time.
And those comments about control problems (eg “ …rudder freeze”) etc….
It is surely the case that an inherently unstable beast like a helicopter is exercising its controls continuously even to maintain its straight and level flight? – I do not know if an autopilot was involved, though.
All I ask is that we all put or efforts into closing off one aspect that we CAN close off – and that is what was the flight plan and what was the practice for safely executing that close in turn to the Mull in those prevailing conditions.