Walter K - You make a number of points and make a number of assumptions that I will address. I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum, and believe that they are not involved.
It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.
You appear to have the belief that regular flight paths are established and have
special arrangements to ease pilot workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be
I am at a loss to understand the significance of this statement. It matters not that you have flown a particular route a hundred times - the same rules of airmanship [and self preservation] applies each time. There are no 'special arrangements to ease pilot workload'. Workload is not reduced by familiarity with a particular route. The ac still has to be flown, with checks to be done, navigation to be carried out [whether visual or electronic] and the ac systems to be tended. Legality is a smokescreen. Weatherwise, you can be legal as hell and still crash the ac through mishandling of the ac or its systems. VFR outside CAS, there is no 'legal'requirement whatsoever to become involved with radio aids.
I know of no pilot who would approach a rock filled cloud without due caution - they would not be trying to judge ANY distance from cloud visually. They knew where they were, could see that the Mull was cloud covered and would have adjusted their intentions accordingly, say, by turning early. Except the ac didn't turn.
Another fact of which you are probably not aware [and have no reason to be] is that the typical time from the onset of an unusual ac malfunction to the pilot physically reacting to it can be as long as 10 SECONDS. This came from an AAIB psychologist who helped me with an unrelated Board of Inquiry. It goes like this - first the pilot has to become aware that there is a problem. Then he has to figure out what the problem is. Then he has to work out what is causing the problem and then react by doing something with the ac and/or ac systems to recify or amelierate the effects of the problem. This is where flight sims come into their own. By repeatedly practicing emergencies and failures, pilot reaction becomes almost instinctive, shaving valuable seconds off the recognition/decision-making process; seconds saved = lives saved.
And knowing roughly where they were, just how likely do you think it is that a highly experienced crew continued on a straight line to make contact with land? I don't think so. [More especially since CRM was in the forefront of the flight safety world at the time]. Furthermore, a crew typically prioritises their attention to tasks according to the prevailing circumstances. A million miles visibility and not an aircraft within a hundred miles = crew chatting about the local barmaid. Marginal visibility with rock-filled clouds about = crew take a special interest in navigation and a plan of action to avoid IMC. Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - how the hell else would they have hit the ground. I note that he did not offer any alternative explanation as to why, other than to suggest the the crew had thumbs up b*ms and mind in neutral. But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.
You hit the nail on the head with:
- in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.
That's the whole point in nearly 1000 posts on the THIRD forum devoted to the subject.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOTS HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CRITICAL PERIOD AS THEY APPROACHED THE MULL OF KINTYRE.
And you state that it is just not credible that control of the aircraft could have been frozen at a critical time. Oh really? Have you ever had a rudder freeze on you at high level, where you had to fly below the zero degree isotherm to allow the ice to thaw out? - I have. Have you ever had the situation where the autopilot would not disengage on the instinctive cutout? - I have. Have you ever experienced an ac major system failure not covered by the checklists? - I have. So if I agree with you it is statistically exceptionally unlikely that there was a loss of control of the ac at a critical time - can you guarantee that that 'exceptionally unlikely' = 100%? I suggest not.
So, we're finally back where the thread started:
NOBODY CAN GUARANTEE 100% THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS PILOT ERROR.
QED - the findings of those 2 fine, upstanding Air Ranking Officers was flawed, and the findings should be quashed. But then, having experienced both of these men, hell will freeze over before their arrogance allows them to admit they were wrong.