FJJP
Thank you for your detailed response which I believe deserves a considered reply.
Firstly, if you son is a Chinook pilot then this may make it easier for you to help with that last point I made in my last posting – “…to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight.”
With regard to that fundamental point of the Mk1 eyeball, I have tried to convey my concerns that in a common situation on a regular flight path there may have been some special arrangement to ease the pilots’ workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be. I would have thought that you have enough flying experience to agree with me that judging ones distance of, say, an isolated cloud is an exercise that may convince you of the problem of approaching the Mull visually at their speed in those circumstances.
On that tragic day, the crew had passed a point already rather too close for visual under the prevailing conditions having had the time to change their route navigation waypoint – which would rather suggest that they were in control at that point.
Between that point and just before impact, work by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company suggests that the a/c had no time to have deviated significantly from its path to have got where it got to (ie. No dramatic turns, slowing, climbs/dives, etc) which suggests that they were basically just carrying on – although others would have it that there was an a/c malfunction that did either of the following:
1. rendered the a/c uncontrollable somehow (whilst leaving it stable and leaving no trace and no call to this effect from the pilots in the 10+secs they had – although this last point seems to have been covered by the lack of recording of the last communication from the ground to the air);
2. sufficiently distracted the pilots that they did not do anything but carry on towards the high ground (your words are so relevant here “…situational awareness... believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place.”) – in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.
Just before impact, the attitude of the a/c and the control positions were entirely consistent with their having SEEN just how close that they had got (eg the shoreline passing underneath or mist flitting past the screen, perhaps) and reacted with an evasive manoeuvre (they very nearly made it, too) – suggesting that they had control at this point too. The hypothesis that a control malfunction occurred for just such a short time at such a critical point, without throwing the a/c off its trajectory or axis in any significant way, and then cleared itself is not credible.
Something had misled them to get so close.
I suppose a brief summary of why I am pushing the nav issue is in order:
Upon hearing of the crash, I immediately suspected sabotage because of who was on board and their plans for a new “offensive” against terrorism in NI. While expecting all possible types of sabotage to be thoroughly investigated by the authorities, I merely wanted to bring their attention to the possibility of the tampering with ground equipment (of the system that I thought would have been used) so that such equipment could have been investigated before evidence was disturbed, say, before a maintenance visit).
I am satisfied by the FAI alone that there was a no evidence of explosion or impact from another object, etc and so the more usual types of sabotage I accept probably did not happen.
The question of navigation, however, seems to have been avoided like the plague in the inquiries – even the actual intended route was not made clear – rather hidden by obfuscation – coming out only in incidental snippets by witnesses and subsequent discussions.
I would like the nav issue to be brought to closure one way or the other – for me this would require a statement from the flight responsible for ferrying such personnel on this route to the effect that the practice in closing with the Mull was:
Purely up to the pilots as per VFR;
Used such and such a navaid in these special circumstances;
Other
And that would do it for me – it is the continued avoidance of this issue that perplexes me – perhaps some of you reading this thread have the connections to apply pressure to achieve this?
As regards you comment “Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio (sic)..” well, I rather think that is naïve and the threat would have been more organised but the motive and who may have done it is a big issue in its own right and inappropriate for this thread –although I am happy to send by private message if you are interested.
All that I hope to achieve in this thread is to get experienced people to see this perspective and help bring this line of enquiry to closure – and not just shoot down the arguments with generalisations and simplistic arguments about rules.
Let me make this very clear – I believe that these pilots were NOT to blame and that their names must be cleared; but it should be by way of getting to the full picture of what happened – and not by petty legal arguments.
Every possibility of sabotage should have been thoroughly considered in view of who was on board and this one line of thought I have endeavoured to express here is one that could be cleared up from constructive input by military aircrew visiting this site.